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COURT-CONNECTED ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN MAINE
Honorable Howard H. Dana, Jr *
In the 21st Century, Maine's courts will offer citizens access to a variety of
means for resolving their disputes, as well as assistance in identifying the dispute
resolution methods most appropriate to their cases. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
With these words of prophecy the Commission to Study the Future of Maine's
Courts launched its discussion of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Although
conceding that "the adversary process.., has served the people of the state well"
and acknowledging that "the state must continue to provide a forum for forceful
advocacy that produces a definite and binding judicial decision" the Commission
asked the Maine judicial and legislative branches to embrace ADR.2
For the last dozen years, the Author has been the Supreme Judicial Court's
(SJC's) liaison to its ADR Planning and Implementation Committee and Chair of
the Court's Advisory Committee to the Court ADR Service (CADRES). 3 In this
Article, he summarizes the arguments for and against court-connected ADR, de-
scribes and assesses the State's various experiments with ADR, with special em-
phasis on the State's recent implementation of mandatory ADR in the Superior
Court, and concludes with some recommendations for the future.
A. What isADR?
ADR in its broadest sense may be an alternative to a trial or an aid to settle-
ment. Because of the public's constitutional right to a jury trial, most court-con-
* Howard H. Dana, Jr., has been an Associate Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
since 1993. He graduated from Bowdoin College in 1962 and received a law degree and masters
in public administration from Comell in 1966 and a masters in judicial process from the Univer-
sity of Virginia in 1998. Following a clerkship with Judge Edward T. Gignoux, he practiced law
with Verrill & Dana primarily in the field of corporate litigation until joining the Court. While a
lawyer, he was appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush to serve on the Board of Directors of
the Legal Services Corporation (1982, 1990-1993). He presently serves as the vice-chair of the
Maine Justice Action Group (JAG), and chair of the Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Com-
mittee. Justice Dana is the Court's liaison to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection. He is
currently a member of the ABA Board of Governors representing District One (Me., N.H., Vt.,
and R.I.). Before his election to the Board, Dana was a member of the ABA Commission on
Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (1988-1992), the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defendants (1994-1997), and the ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Pub-
lic Service. He received an Honorary Degree from the Portland School of Art (1985); the ABA
Pro Bono Publico Award (1985); the Maine State Bar Association Public Service Award (1986);
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Arthur Von Briesen Award (1993); and the
Gordon S. Hargraves Freedom Prize, Bowdoin College (1997).
1. COMM'N TO STuDv Ta FlTruRs OF MAINE'S Courrs, NEw DIMENSIONS FOR JUSICE 38 (1993)
[hereinafter COMMISSION].
2. Id. at 39.
3. Formerly known as the Court Mediation Service.
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nected ADR is usually less the former and more the latter.4 Although the various
types of ADR are probably infinite, the most well-known processes are the follow-
ing: mediation, 5 early neutral evaluation, 6 arbitration,7 advisory arbitration, 8 sum-
mary jury trial, 9 mini-trial, 10 and the judicial settlement conference. 11
B. What Are the Pros and Cons of Court-Connected ADR?
The Commission to Study the Future of Maine's Courts listed a few of the
advantages and none of the disadvantages claimed for court-connected ADR. It
suggested that Maine's forty-nine active trial judges cannot expeditiously process
the quantity of litigation being filed nor are the courts equipped to deal effectively
with the complexity of the public and social policy disputes that increasingly find
their way into court. 12 The Commission stressed the results of their 1992 public
opinion poll "that more than 80% of Mainers support the greater use of processes
suchas mediation and arbitration as alternatives to the traditional trial process. '13
The Commission believed that by diverting some cases to ADR it would increase"access to traditional adjudication" 14 and that a "high quality of justice" can be
achieved "by providing mechanisms that will allow individuals and groups to find
their own solutions to problems." 15 In sum, the Commission saw ADR as a pana-
cea for the Maine Court system and the citizens who use it.
4. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 9-10 (RAND, 1996) [hereinafter KAALIK I]; SARAH R.
COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 2:2 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp.).
5. A process in which a neutral person (mediator) "seeks, by providing information and
suggestions, to guide the parties to a solution acceptable to both of them." See JOHN MONAHAN &
LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 596 (4th ed. 1998).
6. A process in which an experienced trial attorney or other expert hears summaries of the
parties' positions and advises them about the strengths and weaknesses of claims and defenses
and the probable outcome of a trial.
7. Privately selected neutral person (or persons) hears evidence and parties' arguments and
issues an award that can be entered as an enforceable judgment.
8. A process in which a neutral arbitrator hears the parties' evidence and arguments and
issues a non-binding decision.
9. A trial before ajudge and jury in which the lawyers summarize the evidence and then argue
their case to the jury and the judge instructs the jury on the law. The jury deliberates and then
their non-binding verdict is read to the parties.
10. Like the summary jury trial except there is no judge and no jury. A neutral arbitrator
keeps order and each advocate explains his view of the law and the facts to the representatives of
both (or all) parties. Each lawyer is subject to questioning and rebuttal evidence can be offered.
The representatives then discuss a possible resolution.
11. Settlement conference before a judge or other judicial officer usually with parties and
counsel present, where counsel present their case and know that the opposing party is hearing
the presentation. The judge or judicial officer may try to force a settlement rather than facilitate
a mutually acceptable resolution.
12. COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 39. To the same effect the California Business & Profes-
sional Code, in the purposes clause to its mediation statute, lists complexity of litigation as one
of the reasons for court-connected mediation. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 465 (1990).
13. COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 39.
14. Id. See also Robert A. Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PA. ST. L. REV.
1017, 1020 (2004); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PA. ST. L. REv. 165, 194 (2003)
("[T]he public interest itself is served by the peaceful settlement of disputes and unclogging of
court dockets.") (quoting Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 864-65
(1992)).
15. CoMMIssION, supra note 1, at 39.
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By increasing access to dispute resolution, the (court] system will save signifi-
cant intangible costs arising from unresolved problems among neighbors, fami-
lies, schools and children, businesses and public agencies. The system will also
save the very tangible costs resulting from unnecessary demands on the courts,
lost productivity and the need for social services, and law enforcement. 16
As an unabashed advocate for court-connected ADR, the Commission can be for-
given for only extolling the perceived advantages of its recommendations. Others
have provided a more balanced critique.
Advocates of court-connected ADR describe it as often cheaper, quicker, and
better than the adjudicatory trial. 17 Such claims, however, are not universally
endorsed. What follows is a review of the claimed benefits of and problems with
court-connected ADR, for the parties, the courts, and society at large.
1. Benefits for Parties
Those touting ADR claim that it benefits the parties to a dispute by: reducing
16. Id. at 39-40.
17. KAKALnc I, supra note 4, at 10; Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution
in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REV. 889, 914 (1991) ('The former director of the Federal
Judicial Center (Leo Levin] has stated that ADR's goals include avoiding trial (by increasing
settlement ratios), reducing the 'elapsed time to termination of the law suit,' reducing the cost of
litigation, and decreasing the expenditure of judicial resources.") (citations omitted); see Devel-
opments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation: V1. ADR, the Judiciary, and Justice: Coming
to Terms with the Alternatives, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1851, 1853 (2000) [hereinafter Developments
in the Law].
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costs; 18 speeding up the pace of case resolutions; 19 shortening the time to final
18. Hon. Wayne D. Brazil, Institutionalizing ADR Programs in Courts, in EMERGING ADR
ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 68-69 (Frank E. A. Sander ed., 1991); STEVENS H. CLARKE ET
AL., COURT-ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS
(Inst. of Gov't, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill 1996); DAVID C. STEELMAN ET AL., SUPERIOR COURT
RULE 170 PROGRAM AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROSPECTS FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE
TRIAL COURTS 9-14 (Vol. 2 1996) ("There is evidence that little participation is likely in purely'volunteer' ADR programs and in other innovative procedures in civil litigation."); see, e.g.,
ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY, 1984 PROJECT REPORTS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS SuPPORT-
ING THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY (1984)
(quoting Wayne D. Brazil, "Why 'Volunteer'ADR Programs are likely to Attract Few Cases, and
Thus, Why Volunteer Programs Are Not Likely to Contribute Significantly to Cost and Delay
Reduction," in EMERGING ADR ISSUES 122); Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (1994) ("[W]hile the
percentage of parties who reported saving money approximately equaled the percentage who
reported that the process resulted in a net financial cost, the net savings were, on average, more
than ten times larger than the cost of an ENE session."); David S. Winston, Participation Stan-
dards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes: 'You Can Lead A Horse to Water... ' OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 187, 191-92 (1996); COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:3 n.1.; MELINDA OSTERMEYER &
SUSAN L. KEiLmTz, MONITORING AND EVALUATING COURT-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS: A
GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 16 (1997) (ADR saves judicial resources (i.e., time
spent on motions, hearings, and trials)); Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the
Courts: Progress, Problems, and Possibilities, 108 PA. ST. L. REV. 328,332 (2003); Sarah Krieger,
The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 235, 243 (2002)
(quoting Alison E. Gereneser, Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 43, 49 (1995)); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and
Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 225 (1999);
John R. Phillips, Mediation as One Step in Adversarial Litigation: One Country Lawyer's Expe-
rience, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 143 (2002); Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of Insti-
tutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on
Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REv. 473, 528 (2002); 4 Am. JUR. 2O Alternative Dispute
Resolution § 1 (2004); Jack Erler & Dan Kagan, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 16 ME. BAR J.
222, 223 (2001); Bradley A. Coates, Family Law Mediation, 3 HAW. BAR J. 6, 7 (1999); Mark R.
Anderson, Settle or Roll the Dice?, 28 A.B.A.J. LITIGATION 37, 38 (2001) ("[T]he logic of these
initiatives [early mandatory mediation] is straightforward: Parties who start talking settlement
before incurring large costs and adopting stubborn positions should be more likely to find a
middle ground than war-torn, ego-bruised litigants."); Terry L. Trantina, An Attorney's Guide to
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): "ADR 1.01," 1 A.B.A. SEC. Bus. L. 8 (Jan. 2003), at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/0008/adr/adrlOl.pdf. (quoting Abraham Lincoln as
saying, "persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the
nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses and waste of time. As a peacemaker, the
lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still be business enough.").
19. See Brazil, supra note 18, at 68-69; Winston, supra note 18, at 190; Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 673 (1986);
STEELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 8 (reporting that there were more cases disposed of in the
same period that were exposed to ADR than those in the pre-ADR sample; 87.9% vs. 77.5% (a
statistically significant change)); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Media-
tion in Maine:An EmpiricalAssessment, 33 ME. L. REv. 237, 238 (1981); E. ALLAN LIND & JOHN
E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 93
(Federal Judicial Center rev. ed. 1983) ("It is clear that in two of the three pilot districts the
arbitration rules have expedited the disposition of cases ...."); Krieger, supra note 18, at 243;
Senft & Savage, supra note 18, at 327-32; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 18, at 525; Trantina,
supra note 18, at 8.
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resolution; 2 0 increasing the likelihood of settlement;2 1 "improving the quality (ra-
tionality) of the thinking that informs each side's decision about how to proceed
and on what terms to resolve the matter"; 2 2 providing increased party participation
and satisfaction; 2 3 improving communication across party lines;2 4 reducing dis-
trust between parties; 2 5 helping to forge better relations between parties;2 6 im-
20. COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.3 ("late settlement increases costs of discovery and motion
practice"); Brazil, supra note 18, at 68-69; CLARKE ET AL., supra note 18, at vi; Winston, supra
note 18, at 190 ("The imminence of mediation, much like the imminence of trial, can serve as a'settlement event' that induces parties and attorneys to focus on the case and to enter into serious
negotiations.").
21. Winston, supra note 18, at 192 (noting that mandatory mediation is an effective means of
obtaining out-of-court settlements, and "overcomes the sign of weakness that is often associated
with mediation."); COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:2 ("High rates of settlement of civil and divorce
cases are widely known. Research evidence suggest that, at most, mediation provides only
marginal gains to overall settlement rates, but may do much to change the character and timing
of settlement."); id. at § 2:3 n.2 (referencing the National Standards for Court-Connected Me-
diation Programs, Standard 4.1 which aims for case selection including "promoting effective
settlement and avoiding harm to nonparties, promoting continuing relationships, and avoiding
continued court involvement"); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84
B.U. L. REV. t, at 16 (2004) (recognizing settlement as one of the purposes of court-mandated
ADR); Phillips, supra note 18, at 148.
22. Brazil, supra note 18, at 68-69; see also STEELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 13; Dan Kagan
et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution: So, What Does the Court Say About It?, 16 ME. BAR J. 225
(2001) (noting that parties gain a better understanding of their own case and other party's point
of view).
23. Brazil, supra note 18, at 68; McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 238 ("Heightened
participation by disputants in resolving their own dispute should leave them more satisfied with
both the process and the outcome than if they had had their case adjudicated."); COLE ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 2:3 n. I (referencing "participation of parties" as a reason for requiring media-
tion); Francis E. McGovern, Beyond Efficiency: A Bevy of ADR Justifications (An Unfootnoted
Summary), DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE, Summer 1997, at 12 ("People like the ability to par-
ticipate in the resolution of their dispute, the opportunity to appear in a judicial-like setting, and
the receipt of individual attention. Some litigants prefer the privacy of ADR, the less confronta-
tional style, the 'free' discovery, or the bargaining methodology over the procedural litigation
process."); Krieger, supra note 18, at 243; Senft & Savage, supra note 18, at 328 (referring to"consistently high satisfaction rates by participants"); Developments in the Law, supra note 17,
at 1861 (noting that ADR "has the potential to provide a variety of benefits, including greater
satisfaction of the parties").
24. Brazil, supra note 18, 69; Winston, supra note 18, at 191 ("Even when parties fail to
reach a settlement, the enhanced mutual understanding resulting from the mediation process
greatly improves the prospects for a later agreement." (citing CPR INsTrrUTE FOR DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION, CPR MODEL ADR PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES: MEDIATION 1-22 (1994))); McEwen &
Maiman, supra note 19, at 256 (noting that mediation is more likely to cause parties to under-
stand the other side's point of view); COLE Er AL., supra note 4, § 2:3 ("Preservation and im-
provement of continuing relationships between parties is often articulated as a goal for media-
tion."); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 18, at 526 (stating that mediation encourages the par-
ties to communicate directly).
25. Brazil, supra note 18, at 68-69; McGovern, supra note 23, at 13; McEwen & Maiman,
supra note 19, at 256 (mediation helps leach out the anger).
26. Brazil, supra note 18, at 68-69; McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 239 ("[V]entilation
of feelings allows for a healing of wounds."); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 465 (1990) (listing
"continuing relationships" as a reason for requiring mediation); COLE Er AL., supra note 4, § 2:3;
Krieger, supra note 18, at 243 (stating that mediation is supposed to "improve relationships
between disputing parties"); Senft & Savage, supra note 18, at 334 (stating that mediation as an
alternative to adversarial proceedings was meant to "bring together people" and "actually en-
hance [] human connection."); Creo, supra note 14, at 1023-24 (At the same time parties nego-
tiate issues, they engage in a parallel negotiation in which "they work out the terms of their
relationship."); Phillips, supra note 18, at 148.
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proving communication between the lawyer and client; 27 improving communica-
tion between the parties and the court and reducing party-alienation from the pro-
cess by increasing understanding of procedural and substantive matters, reducing
formalities and procedural rigidities, and affording the parties more power than is
available in formal adjudication; 28 enhancing the parties' capacity to protect pri-
vacy interests; 29 creating opportunities for a wider range of outcomes by injecting
more creativity into the design of possible solutions; 30 providing a more flexible
process for resolving disputes; 3 1 providing solutions with which the parties are
more likely to comply; 32 and providing access to ADR, which outside the court
27. Brazil, supra note 18, at 68-69.
28. Id.; McGovern, supra note 23, at 13; McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 237-39
(citing Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
8 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (1956)) (ADR decreases the alienation of citizens when it is made an adjunct
to the formal judicial process. The charge of alienation was first identified by Roscoe Pound in
his 1906 critique of American Justice when he found that citizens too often view courts as in-
timidating, unfair, and incapable of yielding equitable outcomes.); McEwen & Maiman, supra
note 19, at 255 (stating that ADR allows parties more time to explain their side of the dispute);
id. at 256 (noting that the greater informality and privacy of mediation made it less intimidating
and easier to understand than court process); CLARKE ET AL., supra note 18, at 4 ("[Tlhe parties
themselves can best fashion a solution to their dispute."); Winston, supra note 18, at 191 (citing
Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W. Milburn, Explaining a Paradox of Mediation, 9 NEGOTIATION J.
23, 23 (1993) ("[Plarties often benefit from mediation despite the fact that their participation in
the mediation is a result of a court order."); id. ("[Rieluctant parties often use mediation effec-
tively and evaluate their mediation experiences positively."); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 465
(1990) (listing less threatening procedures as a reason for requiring mediation); COLE ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 2:4; Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediating Ideol-
ogy, 2002 J. Disp. REsOL. 81, 93 (2002) (stating that individuals prefer procedures where they
can voice their opinions); Earler, supra note 18, at 224 (mediation lets the parties test their
cases, understand each other, and tell their stories free from the structures of the legal process).
29. Brazil, supra note 18, at 68-69.
30. Id.; McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 239 (noting that mediation provides superior
means of resolving disputes because its procedural flexibility permits consideration of a broader
range of issues); COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:3 n.2 (referencing the National Standards for
Court-Connected Mediation Programs, Standard 4.1 aims for case selection include "promoting
effective settlement and avoiding harm to non-parties, promoting continuing relationships, and
avoiding continued court involvement"); Senft & Savage, supra note 19, at 346-47 (stating that
mediation allows parties to "decide for themselves their own outcome that is uniquely respon-
sive to their situation."); Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1851, 1861, 1871; Creo,
supra note 14, at 1021, 1071 (stating that equitable and non-economic remedies are more likely
in mediation); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 18, at 530; 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute
Resolution § 1 (2004); Trantina, supra note 18, at 7.
31. See CoMMissioN, supra note 1, at 39 ("Flexibility" was one of the attributes of ADR
referred to by the Commission); COLE ET AL,, supra note 4, § 2:7 (discussing the fact that media-
tion depends upon both procedural and substantive flexibility); McEwen & Maiman, supra note
19, at 239 (mediation's "procedural flexibility permits consideration of a broader range of is-
sues, including underlying problems that may prove to be more important to the parties than the
concerns raised in their claim or complaint."); Senft & Savage, supra note 28, at 327-28; Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1871.
32. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 18, at 4 ("[A] voluntary resolution is more likely to be com-
plied with than a court-imposed judgment."); McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 239 (ex-
plaining that participants are more likely to honor obligations contained in the agreements that
they make); id. at 261-64 (mediation more likely to cause compliance with judgments than
adjudications); id. at 241 ("[T]here is emerging evidence that divorce and custody mediation
results more often in compliance with settlements and less often in further litigation than does
adjudication of similar cases."); Senft & Savage, supra note 18, at 328 (stating that after suc-
cessful mediation, there is less likelihood of future litigation); id. at 339; Krieger, supra note 18,
at 244.
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system is generally available only to those who can afford it.33
2. Benefits for the Court System
Proponents believe that ADR benefits the court system by: reducing costs; 34
reducing backlog of older cases; 35 expediting particular categories of cases; 36 pre-
serving the court's reservoir of authority; 37 enhancing the system's legitimacy;3 8
increasing the level of access for those cases requiring adjudication by relieving
the adjudicatory system of those cases that can be resolved through ADR; 39 and
increasing the level of access for those cases employing ADR by providing an
opportunity for ADR.40
3. Benefits for Society
Advocates of ADR claim that ADR changes the "zero sum" game culture to
33. See McGovern, supra note 23, at 13; Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 21, at 240-41;
Senft & Savage, supra note 18, at 333.
34. See Brazil, supra note 18, at 68-69; Winston, supra note 18, at 191-92; id. at 188 (finding
that ADR relieved overburdened and inefficient court system); STEELMAN, ET AL., supra note 18,
at 2 (Comparing ADR project sample with a random pre-project sample indicated that higher
court costs (as reflected by the number of events per case) were incurred in the earlier stages of
ADR sample cases than in the earlier stages of pre-ADR sample cases. However, cases in the
pre-ADR sample had much higher court costs associated with events that occurred later in the
pendency of such cases.); McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 238 ("unclog backed-up court
dockets"); COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:3 n.l; id. at § 2:3; Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 111 F.R.D. 91, 195 (1985)
(And, finally, with court resources being as scarce as they are, it is to everyone's
advantage to save as much of those resources as we can. Many alternative programs
save as much as 50 percent of trials-of judge time devoted to trial. That's a terribly
important thing, not only for those cases going through the alternative mechanism,
but for all the other litigants waiting in line to have their cases heard.);
Senft & Savage, supra note 18, at 332; Hensler, supra note 14, at 175-77, 185 (explaining that
one of the aims of settlement efforts is saving the court and the parties' money).
35. See Brazil, supra note 18, at 68; McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 238 (discussing
impact on "caseload"); Lederman, supra note 18, at 262 (easing docket congestion a plausible
explanation for court encouragement of settlement).
36. OSTERMEYER & KEILITZ, supra note 18, at 16.
37. McGovern, supra note 23, at 13 (Any resolution that does not require judges to decide
preserves the court's "sparse reservoir of authority residing in our judges.").
38. See, e.g., McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 238-39; McGovem, supra note 23, at 13
(Arguing that excessive adversarial sentiment may produce a backlash against the entire system
similar to the backlash against pretrial discovery. Injecting more cooperation into the process
may be seen as restoring a "healthy balance of cooperation and adversarialness that is essential
to the maintenance of our current litigation system."); COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:4; Senft &
Savage, supra note 18, at 328.
39. Improving access was also listed by the Commission; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 465
(listing access as a reason for requiring mediation); COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:3 n.1 (refer-
encing "court caseload" as a reason for requiring mediation); Creo, supra note 14, at 1020 (re-
ducing caseload enhances access to justice); Hensler, supra note 14, at 194.
40. COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:5.
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the "win/win" culture 41 and generates more trust and cooperation thereby creating
a more civil society. 42
On the other hand, detractors and a few supporters have identified a series of
problems associated with court-connected ADR.
4. Problems for Parties
Some believe that engrafting ADR onto the litigation process creates prob-
lems for litigants. These problems include the following: it increases (or at least
does not decrease) the cost of litigation; 43 yields no significant reduction in the
time to resolution;44 has little or no impact on settlement rates;4 5 sacrifices fair-
ness because of pressures to settle; 46 delays a final resolution in some cases; 47
41. STEELMAN, ET AL., supra note 18, at 26; McGovern, supra note 23, at 12-13 (finding that
ADR allows "win-win" solutions to predominate over "zero sum game" solutions); McEwen &
Maiman, supra note 19, at 253 (quoting Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:
Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637 (1976)) ("[A] process like... media-
tion has a 'graduated or accommodative character,' whereas adjudication generally has a binary
character; that is, mediated outcomes can range along a continuum from all to nothing while
adjudicative outcomes tend to be either all or nothing."); Creo, supra note 14, at 1029 (finding
that mediation encourages "cooperative and non-combative behavior.") (citation omitted).
42. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 23, at 13; COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:3, n.1 (referenc-
ing the "economic and social consequences of unresolved disputes" as a reason for requiring
mediation); Brazil, supra note 18, at 56 ("One of organized society's most fundamental respon-
sibilities is to provide means by which people can resolve disputes without violence. In other
words, providing effective dispute resolution processes is an essential public responsibility.");
see also Hensler, supra note 14, at 188 (indicating that evidence demonstrates that mediation
produces little time or cost savings); Hensler, supra note 28, at 81 (arguing that there is no
empirical evidence to support the claim that mediation saves time and money).
43. Winston, supra note 18, at 190 ("unsuccessful mediation followed by litigation ... adds
to the cost of the litigation process."); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18-19 (1995); Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause-
Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26 Ama. Bus. L.J. 575, 583 (advancing that mandatory me-
diation is an exercise in futility if one of the parties enters the mediation determined not to
settle); COLE E- AL., supra note 4, § 2:5 (imposing fees for mandatory mediation on low-income
parties makes this especially critical because there is a barrier created to access); KAKALIK I,
supra note 4, at 10 ("We have no strong statistical evidence that lawyer work hours are signifi-
cantly affected by mediation or neutral evaluation in any of the six programs studied."); Hensler,
supra note 14, at 188 (noting that evidence indicates that mediation produces little time or cost
savings.); Hensler, supra note 28, at 81 (claiming that there is no empirical evidence to support
the claim that mediation saves time and money); Erler & Kagan, supra note 18, at 223.
44. KArALI I, supra note 4, at 11 ("We have no strong statistical evidence that time to
disposition is significantly affected by mediation or neutral evaluation in any of the six pro-
grams studied."); Dayton, supra note 17, at 896 ("These comparisons conclusively show that
ADR has not resulted in speedier resolution of federal civil cases, has not reduced backlogs, and
has not affected the incidence of civil trials."); Erler & Kagan, supra note 18, at 223.
45. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 18, at vii; COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:2 ("Research evidence
suggests that, at most, mediation provides only marginal gains to overall settlement rates, but
may do much to change the character and timing of settlement.").
46. COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:6; Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 21, at 23-26; Senft &
Savage, supra note 18, at 338-39; Hensler, supra note 28, at 96; John P. McCrory, Mandated
Mediation of Civil Cases in State Courts: A Litigant's Perspective on Program Model Choices,
14 OHIo ST. J. o N Disp. RESOL. 813, 830 (1999).
47. Susan C. Kuhn, Comment, Mandatory Mediation: California Civil Code Section 4607,
33 EMORY L.J. 733, 758 (1984) (arguing that mandatory mediation creates another legal obstacle
for the parties to overcome on their way to litigation).
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makes the process more cumbersome and neutrals more scarce because of govern-
ment regulation; 48 produces "unfair" results for weaker parties because of the pro-
cedural and substantive flexibility of mediation;49 produces "unfair" settlements
because of imbalances of power;50 creates a second class of justice for the poor,
either because they can only afford ADR or because they cannot; 5 1 causes judges
to become less involved in cases prior to the ADR effort;52 and diminishes the
effectiveness of ADR because of inappropriate timing.53
5. Problems for the Court System
Detractors also claim that mandatory court-connected ADR: increases court
48. Winston, supra note 18, at 193. Winston notes that one problem with mandatory media-
tion is "defining the level of participation that constitutes compliance with the statute." Id. This
uncertainty generates additional unproductive litigation and a loss of confidentiality. The solu-
tion may be to merely require attendance by a party (or representative with settlement authority)
and an exchange of position papers on disputed issues. See also COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:04
(noting that efforts to promote high quality mediation through qualifications for mediators, ethi-
cal codes and systems for assigning cases can reduce completion and drive up costs). Id. at §
2:8.
49. COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:7; Hensler, supra note 14, at 173 (raising the concern that
in situations involving family violence, the informality of mediation could facilitate manipula-
tion of women by more powerful male partners); McCrory, supra note 46, at 817; Drew Peterson,
What Every Attorney Should Know AboutAlternative Dispute Resolution; 27 Ala. Bar Rag, Mar.-
Apr. 2003, at 9; Coates, Mediation of Divorce and Family Law Cases; A.B.A. Commission on
Domestic Violence, Policy OOAIO9B, available at http://www.abanet.org/domvio/
medrecommend.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
50. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984). See COLE ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 2:2; Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 1873 ("When private neutrals
are paid directly by disputants, they may prove more beholden to the repeat players in commer-
cial disputes than to their adversaries."); Krieger, supra note 18, at 237; Peterson, supra note 49,
at 8; Coates, supra note 18, at 6; A.B.A. Commission on Domestic Violence, Policy OOAJO9B.
51. STEPHEN B.GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 34 (successor ed. 1991); COLE ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 2:5 (requiring parties to pay for mandated mediation raises "deep concerns about
access to mediation for parties with limited resources"). But see BARBARA S. ME EtROEFER, COUR-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS 6 (1990) ("Most parties and their attorneys do not
think that arbitration is a form of second-class justice.").
52. STEELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 16 (Suggesting that ADR causes "some judges to
remove themselves from involvement in the pretrial stages of the cases. As a result, said one
interviewee, they may be less inclined to 'squeeze' counsel or parties to move cases to resolu-
tion."); Brazil, supra note 20, at 90 ("[Olnce an ADR program is institutionalized for certain
kinds of cases, judges might be tempted to shift their energy and attention away from those cases
and toward other matters.").
53. STEELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 16-17 (noting sometimes ADR is held too soon-
"before attorneys have completed enough initial discovery to feel that they have a good enough
understanding of their cases to participate effectively in ADR sessions."); KAKALIK I, supra note
4, at xxxiv
(In the six ADR programs studied as part of the federal experiment pursuant to the
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990; [tlhe problem cited most often by lawyers
and ADR providers was that the parties were not ready to settle. The timing of the
ADR session could be a major factor in this lack of "readiness." . . . Substantial
numbers of lawyers in some districts felt that the sessions were held too early to be
useful.);
Erler & Kagan, supra note 18, at 223.
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costs; 54 and yields no reduction in court workload. 55 They also question the au-
thority of a court to force parties to participate in and pay for a service with the
principal purpose of causing a settlement, especially if the provider of the service
is an individual or a profit-making institution earning more than a de minimis fee,56
and question the propriety of a court channeling money-making work to any indi-
vidual or private institution in competition with others.57
6 Problems for Society
Detractors also believe that ADR conceals problems that would otherwise have
come to the attention of the public and be solved by political forces5 8 and highjacks
a private dispute resolution process and makes it subservient to the court system. 59
ADR is often blamed for the vanishing trial, especially the jury trial; some have
argued that courts seem to place too high a premium on avoiding trials, and trials
are harder to get. 60
54. STEELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 17 (especially costing clerk's offices in low volume
counties); id. at 24 (noting that in larger counties, ADR requires a significant portion of at least
one person's time in the clerk's office); COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:3 ("evidence ... suggests
that savings of money and time for parties may be more likely than savings of money or time for
courts." Such findings make sense when one understands that courts typically have sufficient
work that a decline in one area simply means expanded time to handle work in other areas);
KAKALIK I, supra note 4, at xxxi (In the six ADR programs studied as part of the federal experi-
ment pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990 the court administrative cost per
case ranged from $130 to $490. "The total start-up cost to district courts ranged from $10,000 to
$69,000.").
55. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 18, at vii.
56. Brazil, supra note 18, at 85; Erler & Kagan, supra note 18, at 223-24.
57. Brazil, supra note 18, at 86.
58. Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and Outcomes: Measure-
ment Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENv. U. L. REv. 419, 433 (1989); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra
note 51, at 15; COLE ET AL., supra note 4, § 2:2 ("Commentators claim that it is unjust to permit
private settlements because enforcement agencies are denied information to ascertain patterns
of misbehavior and to address them."); Fiss, supra note 50, at 1078-79; id. at 1085-88 (by set-
tling, justice is not necessarily done, force is not given to values embodied in the Constitution or
statutes, and no authoritative interpretation of law is given); Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note
21, at 14-15
(By taking this narrow "dispute resolution" approach, other considerations within the
wider realm of "law"-including providing norms, social control, affording a public
forum, providing future guidance for others similarly situated, creating precedent,
and building a body of decisions for sue both directly and by analogy-are disre-
garded and discarded without apparent thought.);
Lederman, Precedent Lost, 221, 258-59; Developments in the Law, 1851, 1854; Creo, supra
note 14, at 1031; Krieger, supra note 18, at 240-41, 249-51 (stating that court mediation
reprivatizes family law and is a setback for victims of domestic violence); Patricia Lee Refo,
Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, 30 A.B.A. J. SEC. LmG. 2,4 (2004) (observing that the
results of ADR are shielded from public view).
59. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3 ("Some see attorney involvement in mediation and
other forms of alternative dispute resolution as part of an 'institutionalization and legalization of
ADR' in which lawyers have captured or co-opted innovative ways of resolving disputes and
returned them to the adversarial system."); Creo, supra note 14, at 1045 (listing negative im-
pacts of institutionalization of mediation); Senft & Savage, supra note 18, at 336; Hensler, su-
pra note 14, at 192 (stating that court mediation often resembles traditional judicial settlement
conferences).
60. See, e.g., Peter L. Murray, The Disappearing Massachusetts Civil Jury Trial, MASS. L.
REv. (Spring, 2005).
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With these arguments in mind, should the court system offer parties an oppor-
tunity to engage in court-connected ADR? Based on the Maine experience, this
Author believes the answer is an unqualified "yes." A slightly closer question is
whether the court-system should require that participation.
C. Should Court-Connected ADR be Mandatory or Voluntary?
It has been suggested that all of the benefits of court-connected ADR are re-
tained and most of the problems are mitigated if ADR is voluntary (i.e., the court
system makes ADR options available to the parties but does not require their use).
This suggestion is seductive. Lawyers are honorable people and will do what is in
their clients' best interests. Lawyers know best whether and when to engage in
settlement efforts. Forcing all litigants to engage in ADR at the same time and in
a particular way is subject to the "one size fits all" criticism that is often directed at
the adjudicatory system.
Wayne D. Brazil,6 1 a leading proponent of court-connected ADR makes the
case against voluntary programs. Arguing that "little participation is likely in purely'volunteer' ADR programs," he explains that
[t]o "volunteer" a case into a program, usually all parties must agree, and when
one party/lawyer suggests participation in an ADR program, the other parties/
lawyers are likely to be suspicious that some ulterior motive inspires the sugges-
tion, e.g., that the party making the suggestion is doing so because it expects to
gain some advantage over the others through the ADR process that has been
suggested. Some attorneys and many clients, even now, are unaware of ADR.62
Mr. Brazil has further argued that some have become accustomed to doing things
in certain ways and find those ways comfortable; they resist trying something new
because it takes more energy.
Attorneys are overworked and practice in a largely reactive mode, putting out the
hottest fires first (trials and imminent trials are the hottest fires); they often feel
they have little time for longer range planning or to step back from the day-to-
day, immediate needs of their practice to look thoughtfully at alternative ways of
proceeding or to develop big-picture strategies for meeting efficiently the needs
of individual cases. 63
Some attorneys fear the unknown-they fear things untried or new-they fear
loss of control over and loss of predictability in the process... [slome attorneys'
fear loss of control over inputs (about the litigation) to their own client, or out-
61. Judge Brazil is a Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the Northern
Division of California and recognized authority in court-connected ADR. Brazil, supra note 18.
62. Id. at 122. This observation was recently echoed by the authors of a study by Rand's
Institute for Civil Justice evaluating some of the pilot projects in the federal courts pursuant to
The Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990. James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inex-
pensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49
ALA. L. REv. 17, 35 (1997) [hereinafter Kakalik II]. It has also been noted that "[n]either law-
yers nor judges have used any type of ADR extensively when its use is voluntary." Id. See also
Meierhoefer, supra note 51, at 11 ("Voluntary alternative programs in other jurisdictions have
been notably unsuccessful in attracting cases. Programs that do not attract cases are unlikely to
have any overall effect on the cost of litigation or court burden."); Senft & Savage, supra note
18, at 329-30.
63. Brazil, supra note 18, at 122-23.
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puts (communications) from their client to the opposition. Some attorneys fear
that by suggesting ADR they will appear (to their own clients and/or to their
opponents) as something less than a completely aggressive "gladiator." Some
attorneys fear that making an election, a choice/decision, that appears so funda-
mental (which procedure to use) needlessly creates something for which they can
be second-guessed, criticized, and sued by their own client. 64
Finally, some attorneys are "reluctant to give up the fee-generating potential
of the traditional litigation process and to move into an alternative that might gen-
erate appreciably less income for counsel." '65
D. If Mandatory, Should the iming be Left to the Parties and Their Lawyers?
This is not a subject that has received much critical attention. Lawyers can be
expected to say-if we must do this (i.e., ADR), at least let us pick the time. All the
reasons marshaled for having a voluntary program, can be marshaled for giving
the lawyers control over timing. It is also true that at least some of the arguments
for a mandatory program augur for the court being involved in setting the time of
the ADR.66 Additionally, for the cases that settle early, it is probable that discov-
ery and trial preparation costs have been saved. It also may be argued that for
those cases that do not settle and require involvement of the court to resolve the
matter, requiring the parties to engage in ADR has increased their costs. Finally
the Author has had a working hypothesis that the sooner the parties and their law-
yers begin to discuss the possibility of settlement, the more likely they will reach a
settlement. As we will see from the Maine experience with ADR, especially in the
Superior Court, there is some evidence to support this hypothesis.
E. A Caution
In determining whether a court should adopt either voluntary or mandatory
court-connected ADR or involve the court in setting the time of ADR, we would
do well to reflect on the advice of Richard A. Posner:
[Tihe success or failure of [a proposed alternative to the conventional methods of
resolving legal disputes] must be verifiable by accepted methods of (social) sci-
entific hypothesis testing. I am unconvinced by anecdotes, glowing testimonials,
confident assertions, appeals to intuition. Lawyers, including judges and law
professors, have been lazy about subjecting their hunches-which in honesty we
should admit are often little better than prejudices-to systematic empirical test-
ing. Judicial opinions and law review articles alike are full of assertions-about
the effects of a comparative negligence standard, jurors' comprehension of in-
structions .... the social utility of pretrial discovery, the virtues of adversarial
compared to inquisitorial techniques, and hundreds of other matters-that have
no demonstrable factual basis.... If we are to experiment with alternatives to
trials, let us really experiment; let us propose testable hypotheses, and test them.67
64. Id. at 123.
65. Id.
66. It avoids giving one lawyer or side a veto power. It avoids the "sign of weakness"
problem. It avoids the deferral of the unknown problem.
67. MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 5, at 596 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Richard A. Posner,
The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Caution-
ary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 367 (1986)).
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II. THE MAINE EXPERIENCE-EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF
COURT-CONNECTED ADR
It is probable that various extrajudicial methods for resolving disputes have
been employed in Maine for hundreds of years. 68 It is also probable that judicially
sponsored settlement conferences have been a part of the legal landscape for as
long as we have had judges. Other than these judicially sanctioned settlement
conferences, formal court-connected ADR has been employed in Maine only for
about twenty-five years. 69
A. Small Claim Mediation in Maine
"Sponsored by the Cumberland County Bar Association and originally funded
by the Maine Council for the Humanities and Public Policy," 70 court-connected
small claim mediation in Maine began as a pilot project in the fall of 1977.71 After
expanding to Biddeford, Brunswick, Augusta, and Lewiston, the program received
state funding in 1979 and legislative authorization in 1980.72 Today, every Dis-
trict Court that handles small claims has a mediation component.
In 1981, Craig A. McEwen and Richard J. Maiman provided an empirical
assessment of the small claims pilot project.73 They found that early judicial skep-
ticism had been replaced with the view that small claims mediation was "useful,"
that it served to "remove inappropriate cases from the docket," and that it "allow led]
judges more time for the cases remaining on their calendars. ' 74 Attorneys report-
edly found it a "superb device.., to coax an unreasonable client into a reasonable
settlement."'75 The principal findings from their comprehensive study were that:
1. Two-thirds of the mediations ended in agreement. 76
2. Relatively complicated cases proved the hardest to resolve through mediation. 7 7
3. Mediation worked equally well for well-acquainted and unacquainted persons.7 8
4. Defendants were far more likely to obtain judgment if they tried mediation and
failed (i.e., 39%) than if they went directly to an adjudication (i.e., 17%). 79
5. A mediated settlement was equally likely in those cases in which mediation was
mandatory and those in which it was voluntary.80
6. Mediators (65%) were far more likely than judges (24%) to make arrangements
for payment.8 1
68, In 1784, when Maine was part of Massachusetts, the practice of resolving disputes by
dueling was outlawed. 1784 Mass. Acts 193. Until recently it was still illegal. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 1351 (1983). The Maine Legislature has recently repealed this provision. 1997
Me. Laws 623. Presumably, the motivation for this repeal was not to reintroduce that ADR
option into Maine.
69. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 241-42.
70. Id. at 242.
71. Id. at 241-42.
72. Id. See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7469 (repealed 1982) (giving the district court
power to require parties to mediate small claims before adjudication).
73. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 19, at 241.
74. Id. at 242.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 249-50.
77. Id. at 250.
78. Id. at 251.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 252.
81. Id.
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7. In virtually every case that settled through mediation (92.4%), plaintiffs ob-
tained a positive award, while plaintiffs in 17.2% of adjudications received a
defendant's verdict.82
8. On the other hand, almost half the plaintiffs that went to trial (i.e., 48.5%)
obtained a judgment greater than 90% of their demand. This compares to only
16.9% of plaintiffs trying mediation who settled for over 90% of their de-
mand.83
9. On the average, small claim mediation lasted longer (i.e., 25.7 minutes) than
trials (i.e., 14.4 minutes).84
10. Participants in mediations were more likely (i.e., 93.6%) to feel that they had
sufficient time to fully explain their side of the case than in adjudications (i.e.,
80.5%).85
11. Participants were far more likely to understand "everything that was going on"
in mediations (i.e., 78.6%) than in adjudications (i.e., 64.8%).86
12. Participants were twice as likely to increase their understanding of the other
party's point of view in mediation (i.e., 30%) as in an adjudication (i.e., 14%).87
13. Participants were somewhat more likely to be completely or mostly satisfied
with mediation (i.e., 66.6%) than they were with an adjudication (i.e., 54%).88
14. Plaintiffs who recovered nothing were far more likely to view their mediation
as fair (i.e., 53.8%) than were plaintiffs who recovered nothing from their
adjudication (i.e., 8%). Correspondingly, defendants who ended up agreeing
to pay over 90% of the plaintiffs' claims were almost twice as likely to view
the mediation as fair (i.e., 66.7%) as their counterparts who ended up with
such a judgment following adjudication (i.e., 37.1%).89
15. Settlements requiring the payment of money were far more frequently paid in
full (70.6%) than were adjudicated judgments (33.8%). Correspondingly, no
payments were made in 45.1% of the adjudicated judgments and only 12.8%
of the mediated judgments. 90
While mediation of small claims disputes in Maine began as a voluntary ex-
periment in the Portland District Court, today, financed by a $5 surcharge on the
small claim filing fee, a small claims mediator is available to assist the parties in
reaching their own settlement whenever a small claims docket is held throughout
Maine.9 1
B. Child Custody Disputes in Maine
In 1977, Maine established a court-sponsored voluntary mediation service for
domestic relations cases. In a 1982 report to the Chief Justice, the status of domes-
82. Id. at 253.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 255.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 256.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 256-57.
89. Id. at 258.
90. Id. at 261.
91. Interview with Diane Kenty, Director, Office of Court Alternative Dispute Resolution
(July 1, 2004).
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tic relations mediation was described: For Fiscal Year 1981: 130 domestic rela-
tions mediation cases; average time-2 hours, 45 minutes (range: 10 minutes to 8
hrs.); 68 resolved by mediator, 36 referred to judge, 26 continued. For Fiscal Year
1982: 83 domestic relations mediation cases; average time-2 hours, 15 minutes
(range: 20 minutes to 7 hours); 47 resolved by mediator, 19 referred to judge, 17
continued.92
In fiscal year 1981 court-sponsored domestic relations mediation was occur-
ring in only seven District Courts (out of 32) and two Superior Courts (out of
16).93 In his cover letter to the Chief Justice enclosing his report, Lincoln Clark,
the Director of the Court Mediation Service, stated that:
[O]ur experience has demonstrated [in domestic relations cases] that mediation
is generally a better solution than litigation.
Where adversarial trials tend to exacerbate differences, mediation works to
lead the parties to a common ground. Because the mediator has more time to
listen than our over-burdened trial judges, the underlying causes of disputes are
more likely to be aired; and because a mutually acceptable mediated solution
more often than not leaves the parties on speaking terms, compliance with the
resulting court order is facilitated, which is critically important when the custody
of children is involved. In intra-family disputes, mediation makes a unique con-
tribution both to the judicial system and to the welfare of the parties. 94
On March 17, 1983, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court issued the
following order designed to encourage, but not require, mediation in domestic re-
lations cases:
" Attorneys to inform clients of the availability of court-sponsored mediation, and
to discuss the possibility of mediation with a client and opposing counsel.
" Judges to inquire about efforts to settle, and to recommend mediation where
appropriate.
" Courts to give scheduling priorities to cases where parties have attempted to
mediate. 95
With the Court's urging, between May and December of 1983 an average of
50 divorce cases per month were mediated.96
In 1983, the Maine Legislature established the Commission to Study the Mat-
ter of Child Custody in Domestic Relations. In its 1984 Report the following year,
the Commission recommended:
Institutional changes that emphasize conciliation and agreement should be made
in the present system for handling matters of child custody in domestic relations
cases.
The current trial-focused system for addressing child custody disputes is
inherently antagonistic to the goals of providing stability for children, meaning-
ful parent-child relationships, sufficient living arrangements and support, and
responsible communication between adults. Divorce proceedings should be re-
92. COURT MEDIATION SERVICE, JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF MAINE, MEDIATION IN MAINE:
FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS 21, 23 (November 1982) (finding that Mediation Service at the time
operated in the areas of small claims, landlord/tenant, disclosure, and domestic).
93. Id. at 26, 28.
94. Id. (Letter from Lincoln Clark, Court Mediation Service, to Hon. Vincent McKusick,
Judicial Department, State of Maine (Nov. 16, 1982)).
95. Me. Office of Legis. Assistants, Report of the Commission to Study the Matter of Child
Custody in Domestic Relations Cases 37, n.46 (1984) Lhereinafter Report-Child Custody].
96. Id. at n.47.
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moved from the adversary process and placed in a forum where discussion, com-
promise, and communication will be fostered in the best interest of the parties
and children involved. 97
The Commission did not favor mandatory mediation because of a fear it could
increase the time and cost of the divorce process.
Nevertheless, in 1983, the Maine Legislature rejected the Commission's rec-
ommendation and mandated mediation before any contested domestic relations
hearing involving children. 9 8 Mediation was to occur before someone other than
the Court because, as the Commission concluded,
The judge cannot sit down with the parties around a table and engage in an exten-
sive discussion, focusing first on the best interest of the children, and only sec-
ond on the parties' interest and their economic disputes. A judge who becomes
too involved in attempting to promote settlements may be viewed as compromis-
ing judicial objectivity if the matter ultimately must go to trial and decision. 99
In 1995, the State Justice Institute (SJI) awarded Maine a grant to study the
effectiveness of domestic relations mediation in Maine. Participants (attorneys,
parties, and mediators) in domestic relations mediations at eight court sites were
asked to complete evaluation forms following mediation sessions. Questionnaires
from 2695 people were tabulated and the results were released in a report entitled
"'Trapping the Data': Mediation Programs in Maine." The principal findings of
the Report are as follows:
1. Satisfaction. 4 out of 5 mediators (81%), 3 out of 4 mothers (75%) and
fathers (73%) were satisfied with the outcome. 100
2. Costs. More than half (56%) of the attorneys surveyed believed that me-
diation had reduced their client's costs, 19% believed there was no change, and
only 16% believed that mediation increased client costs. 101 The parties had a
different perspective. Only 10% of the mothers and 11% of the fathers indicated
that mediation had decreased their costs. 102 This divergence between counsel and
97. Id. at ii-iii.
98. P.L. 1983, ch. 813, § 3.
99. Report-Child Custody, supra note 95, at 15 (citing Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges,
96 HI- v. L. REV. 374,426-35 (1982)).
100. MARKET DEcisIONS, INC., "TRAPPING THE DATA": MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN MAINE 4 (Aug.
1997).
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id.
Table A
Impact on Costs
Attorneys Mothers Fathers
Increases Costs 16% 27% 32%
No change 19% 33% 32%
Decreases Cost 56% 10% 11%
Don't Know 9% 29% 25%
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clients is perhaps not surprising. From a client's perspective everything increases
costs. The attorneys have the benefit of experience and are in a better position to
assess whether a particular expenditure of time reduces anticipated total costs.
3. Time. Most attorneys (62%), but relatively few mothers (16%) and fathers
(20%), indicated that mediation reduced the time that both attorneys and clients
otherwise would have spent. 103 The same observation about the reason for the
attorney/client divergence on the cost of mediation can also be made about their
relative assessments of the impact on time to resolution.
4. Family Relationships. Twenty-eight percent of the mothers and 30% of the
fathers indicated they thought that the mediation improved their dealings with the
other parent, while 9% of both felt the relationship worsened as a result of the
mediation. 104
103. Id. at 5-6.
Table B
Impact on Tme to Resolution
Attorneys Mothers Fathers
Increases Time 17% 31% 28%
No change 21% 29% 30%
Decreases Time 62% 16% 20%
Don't Know 0% 24% 22%
104. Id. at 6.
Table C
Impact on Relationship with Spouse
Mothers Fathers
Improved Relations 28% 30%
No change 41% 43%
Made Relations Worse 9% 9%
Don't Know 22% 18%
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5. Understanding. Fifty-eight percent of the mothers and 63% of the fathers
indicated that the mediation had the effect of improving at least somewhat their
understanding of the other person's perspective. 105
6. Outcome. Forty-two percent of the mediation sessions resulted in total
settlement; 29% reported settlement of some, but not all, issues; 15% reported no
settlement; and 14% reported the scheduling of a follow-up mediation session. 106
In the future, the court system should compare the levels of satisfaction fol-
lowing mediated settlements with that following trials. One Virginia study found
that "mothers in litigation reported significantly greater satisfaction with the out-
come of the court contact. Specifically, mothers in litigation felt that they had won
more and lost less in comparison with mothers in mediation." 10 7 In a follow-up
study, the authors reported that
[Miediation was found to keep a substantial number of families out of court and
to produce agreements in less than half the time it took to litigate settlements. No
differences were found in the content of the mediated and litigated agreements in
either study, with the exception that joint legal custody was a more frequent out-
come of mediation. 108
In Maine today, by court rule, the judicial department requires parties in virtu-
ally all contested family or domestic relations cases (i.e., with or without children)
to engage in mediation. 109 The volume of this mediation is growing.
105. Id.
Table D
Impact on Understanding of Other's Perspective
Mothers Fathers
Improved to a Great Extent 12% 12%
Improved Somewhat 46% 51%
No Improvement 42% 37%
Id.
106. Id. at 10.
107. Robert Emery & Melissa Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: An Experi-
mental Evaluation of the Experience of Parents, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 179, 183
(1987).
108. Robert E. Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Further Evidence of
the Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 410, 414
(1991).
109. See ME. R. FAM. CT. II.B(2), C(2), D.
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C. The 1988-1990 Superior Court Pilot Project
For eighteen months in 1988-1990 approximately 15% of the non-domestic
civil filings in the Superior Court in Knox and York Counties experienced an "ADR
Conference" soon after the filing of the answer. 110 Litigants who either volun-
teered for or were assigned to the ADR track paid a total fee of $250. Experienced
trial lawyers, after three hours of training, served as ADR neutrals for a fixed fee of
$250. Although called "mediators," 111 most acted as "early neutral evaluators" 12
and saw their function as settling the case. During the 18-month period, 170 cases
were randomly assigned to ADR, 156 to the regular pre-trial track, and 87 cases
voluntarily entered the ADR experiment. 113 As of November 1, 1991, 38 months
after the project began and 20 months after the start of the last case when approxi-
mately 89% of the 413 cases had been resolved, Professor Craig A. McEwen's
analysis of the results1 14 disclosed the following:
Overall Settlement Patterns. Although cases voluntarily signing up for ADR
experienced a significantly higher level of settlements (79%), the settlement rates
of the cases assigned to ADR (69%) and to the control group (65%) were compa-
rable. 115
The Speed of Settlement. On the average, cases experiencing ADR settled
sooner than cases not experiencing ADR. Voluntary ADR cases settled on average
in about 67% of the time (268 days) that it took the control cases to settle (400
days) and the assigned ADR cases took about 85% of the time (340 days) it took
the control cases to settle. 116 Cases that experienced ADR and did not settle,
however, averaged 468 days to disposition-19% longer than the average for the
entire control group (i.e., 400 days) to reach disposition. 117 The ADR experience
accelerated the resolution time for those cases that did settle and lengthened the
resolution time for those cases that did not. 1t 8
Discovery. Perhaps because discovery was suspended prior to the ADR con-
ference, discovery requests were substantially fewer in the cases experiencing ADR.
The control group averaged 4.7 requests for discovery; the assigned group 3.1
requests; and the voluntary group 2.6 requests. 119 Mediators, however, listed the
absence of formal discovery as the primary reason for non-settlement in 29% of
the conferences in which no settlement was achieved. 120
Motions and Court Hearings. The level of formal court involvement in ADR
cases was significantly lower than in the control group. In 54% of the cases in the
control group there was a court hearing compared with only 35% of the assigned
ADR group cases and 30% of the voluntary ADR cases. 12 1
110. CRAIG A. McEWEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE ADR PILOT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (Bowdoin
College 1992) i, iii.
111. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
112. See KAKALIK I, supra note 4.
113. McEWEN, supra note 110, at iii.
114. See McEWEN, supra note 110.
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id. at 7-9.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. id. at 9.
120. Id. at 9-11.
121. Id. at 11-12.
[Vol. 57:2
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN MAINE
Impact on the Courts. In both York County and Knox County, the ADR pilot
project produced more and earlier settlements. Its impact, however, on the two
dockets was negligible. 122 Although "average days from filing to final disposi-
tion" fell in both counties, it also fell statewide. 123 Part of the reason for this
negligible impact may be the fact that only 15% of civil filings in the two counties
experienced ADR. 12 4
Costs and Problems of Implementing the Pilot Project. In addition to the prob-
lem of imposing a mediation fee of $250 on the litigants, because the income went
into the State's General Fund 12 5 and the Legislature did not increase the system's
appropriation accordingly, the Court system was required to absorb the full cost of
the $250 payment to each mediator. 126 Additionally, the Court system fully ab-
sorbed the substantial hidden administrative costs of the project. These adminis-
trative costs were absorbed almost entirely by the clerks' offices in the two coun-
ties. 127
The ADR Process.
Ambiguity and vagueness in the court order establishing the Pilot Project
and the very limited training [of mediators] left unclear precisely what the "ADR
mediators" were expected to do as neutrals.... Because of these ambiguities in
the "mediator" role, it is not at all clear what the 74 different ADR "mediators"
actually did during their ADR conferences. 128
The average length of each conference was 2.6 hours. 129 Sometimes the "media-
tors" withheld judgment (37%), or expressed views on the legal merits (38%), on
case value (24%), or on a likely court outcome (25%).130 Settlements were re-
ported to be far less likely (21%) if the mediator's view on the legal merits, case
value, or likely case outcome was withheld than if one or more of these views were
revealed to the parties (50%).13 1
Settlement was, however, far more likely in cases where the "mediator" en-
couraged the parties to do most of the talking (71%) as compared to those in-
stances when the parties only did some of the talking (41%) or none of it (28%).132
D. The 1995-1997 Superior Court Pilot Project
The Pilot Project.
On July 1, 1995, in response to the report of the Commission on the Future of
Maine's Courts, the Supreme Judicial Court commenced a two-year pilot project
in the Superior Court in Kennebec, Aroostook, Sagadahoc, and Androscoggin Coun-
ties in which most newly filed cases were to experience a dispute resolution con-
122. Id. at 13.
123. Id.
124. [d. at 13-14.
125. With few exceptions, the Maine Legislature has required that all income be deposited in
the General Fund for the Legislature to dispense. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 116 (West Supp.
1997). This tends to undermine the attractiveness of any "fee for service" governmental effort.
126. McEWEN, supra note 110, at 15.
127. Id. at 15-18.
128. Id. at 18-19.
129. McEwaN, supra note 110, at 19.
130. Id. at 19.
131. Id. at 19-21.
132. Id. at 22.
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ference conducted by a volunteer neutral attorney (the Volunteer Neutral Confer-
ence or VNC). 133 In two of the counties (Kennebec and Sagadahoc), the VNC
was to be held before discovery and in the other two counties (Androscoggin and
Aroostook), the VNC was to be held halfway through discovery. 134 Each pair of
counties included a county with a large population (Kennebec and Androscoggin)
and a county with a relatively small population (Sagadahoc and Aroostook). 135
As originally envisioned, the neutral attorney's task was to listen to each party's
description of the dispute, explore the possibilities of immediate settlement, and
advise about ADR processes that might be suitable for resolving the dispute. 136 If
a settlement was not achieved at the VNC, the Neutral was to work with the parties
and their counsel to reach an agreement on the best process for resolving the con-
troversy, either by first utilizing a compensated ADR process (the Compensated
Neutral Conference or CNC) or going directly to a trial. 137 If the parties could not
agree on how to proceed, the Volunteer Neutral was to determine the process that
the Neutral believed was most appropriate and draft a proposed order directing the
parties to undertake that process. 13 8 After a review and approval by a judge, the
order would govern the future course of proceedings. 139 As developed by the
Court's ADR Planning and Implementation Committee, on which the Author sat as
the Court's liaison, the pilot project was designed to promote more extensive use
of ADR services, to evaluate the effectiveness of those services, and to assess, in
particular, when during the litigation process the services were most effective. 140
In announcing the project, Chief Justice Daniel E. Wathen described the hopes
and aspirations of the Court: "We hope that this project will be beneficial for
everyone involved.... It may prove to be at least part of the answer to crowded
courts, delays in hearing cases and litigation costs that are just too high." 14 '
The Chief Justice continued:
An important feature of the pilot project is that clients will be required to be
involved early in the discussion of alternative dispute resolution methods along
with their respective attorneys and a neutral, volunteer attorney.... Whether or
not this experiment is successful will depend on these volunteer lawyers .... I
believe we are entering a new era where increasing attention will be focused on
the role of lawyers as problem solvers. 142
Cushman Anthony, a Portland lawyer, mediator, and the Chair of the ADR
Planning and Implementation Committee, opined that the primary goals of the
133. RICHARD J. MAIMAN ET AL., THE MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PILOT PROJECT PROGRAM EVALUATION FINAL REPORT 1 (1999).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at4.
137. See id. at 5.
138. Id.
139. Administrative Order to Establish Alternative Dispute Resolution Pilot Project, Docket
No. SJC-319, App. A, Experimental Rule 16B(e)(7) & (8); App. B, Experimental Rule 16C(g)(7)
& (8). (Adopted May 25, 1995).
140. MAIMAN ET AL, supra note, 133, at 4.
141. Press Release accompanying Administrative Order to Establish Alternative Dispute
Resolution Pilot Project, 2 (1995).
142. Id.
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two-year experiment were to make the resolution of civil disputes faster and less
expensive and to achieve settlements that yield greater citizen satisfaction. 143
With funds from a $120,000 grant from the State Justice Institute, the Court
retained the services of the Muskie Institute of Public Affairs of the University of
Southern Maine to study the experiment and evaluate it by comparing the results
obtained in the four selected counties with those in the two "control counties"
(Penobscot and Oxford), including settlement rates, client satisfaction, and the
impact on cost for the parties and the court. 144 Over ninety attorneys participated
in a two-day training course in preparation for their role as Neutrals, and most also
participated in a third day of follow-up training. 145
The Evaluation.
The evaluation of the two-year project proceeded on several fronts. This Au-
thor analyzed the docket sheets of a random sample of the cases filed in the experi-
mental and control counties during the nine months commencing July 1, 1992
(i.e., before implementation) and all the cases filed in those six counties during the
first nine months of the project period (1995-97).
At the conclusion of each conference, a questionnaire was distributed for
completion by the parties, the lawyers, and the Neutral and mailed to the Muskie
Institute for analysis. This article has benefited from the Author's access to the
conclusions revealed by the Muskie Institute in a series of interim and then its final
report on the "Dispute Resolution Conference Pilot Project." 146
This Author sent a second questionnaire to over 700 lawyers who participated
in the pilot project and analyzed over 300 responses to this questionnaire.
The Muskie Institute extensively interviewed many of the "architects" and
administrators of the project, and a sample of the lawyers and Neutrals involved in
the project and polled all of the Neutrals for their views. These necessarily subjec-
tive evaluations were supplemented by testimony from many of the Neutrals at a
meeting scheduled to seek their views and thank them for their service.
Summary of Findings.
What did we learn about court-connected ADR from the 1995-97 Pilot Project?
The project was a fair test of both an early and a midpoint case management
conference involving the parties, their lawyers, and a professional (not a judge)
who (sometimes) employed techniques associated with mediation, early neutral
evaluation, or a judicial settlement conference. It appears to have generated a
burst of early settlements and an overall increase in the number of settlements. 147
The project was not a fair test of the value of a Compensated Neutral Confer-
ence. Less than 10% of the eligible cases experienced a Compensated Neutral
143. Id.
144. MAIMAN ET AL., supra note 133, at 1.
145. Hon. Howard H. Dana, Jr., Court-Connected Alternative Dispute Resolution in Maine
32 (1998) (unpublished masters thesis, Muskie School of Public Service) (on file with Author)
[hereinafter Dana Thesis].
146. MAIMAN ET AL., supra note 133; MUSKE INSTITUTE oF PuBLic AFFAIRS OF THE UNIVERSITYOF
SOUTHERN MAINE, INTERIM REPORTS ON THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CONFERENCE PILOT PROJECT (Aug.
26, 1998, and Nov. 4, 1996; Nov. 21, 1996; Jan. 14, 1997; March 17, 1997; March 21, 1997; and
June 16, 1997) [hereinafter MUSKIE INTERIM REPORTS].
147. The recent RAND study of the CJRA pilot projects confirmed this finding. See Kakalik
I, supra note 62, at 36.
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Conference. Apparently, the Neutrals at the VNCs rarely proposed that the court
order the parties to pay for an ADR experience if they were not otherwise willing.
Although the timing of the early VNC was sometimes criticized as being "too
early," 148 the objective data does not support that criticism. The unhappiness of
attorneys and Neutrals with the timing of the early conference was reflected in the
Muskie Institute interviews. 149 Surprisingly, however, the lawyers experiencing
the early conference preferred the timing of the conference by a substantial margin
(52.5% to 34.4%).150
Reviewing some of the alleged pros and cons of court-connected ADR dis-
cussed at the outset of this paper, it would appear that the Volunteer Neutral Con-
ferences:
a. Reduced party costs. For those litigants who settled quickly the early em-
phasis on substantive settlement discussions unquestionably reduced party costs.
For the additional 5 to 11% who settled ultimately and thereby avoided the cost of
a trial or a dispositive motion, we can only speculate as to their savings. More
lawyers believed that the VNC increased costs than believed that it decreased costs.
Among the lawyers who felt the impact of the VNC was substantial, however,
more lawyers felt the VNC decreased rather than increased costs.151 Those who
estimated the "cost" of the VNC (presumably counsel fees to prepare for and at-
tend the conference) quantified the average to be in the $500 to $700 range, while
those who estimated the cost savings from the conference (presumably counsel
fees saved in achieving a settlement earlier than anticipated) quantified the aver-
age as between $3,500 and $4,000.152 Responses to both questions were rela-
tively few and are not considered a reliable sample of the whole. It should be
noted that the RAND study of mediation and early neutral evaluation programs in
the federal courts revealed no strong statistical evidence that those programs im-
pacted litigation costs. 153
b. Shortened the time to final resolution. Subjectively, most Neutrals and
one-half of the lawyers interviewed believed that the VNCs hastened resolutions
"sometimes." 154 After twenty-nine months, the average time from filing to reso-
lution decreased in all four project counties relative to the same counties three
148. Interestingly, the authors of the recent RAND study of ADR in the federal courts re-
ported a similar observation. Id. at 38 ("Substantial numbers of lawyers in some districts felt
that the sessions were held too early to be useful.").
149. The Muskie Institute Project Director, David Karraker, conducted interviews with three
members of the judiciary, sixteen conference neutrals, ten participating lawyers (three of whom
were also conference neutrals), and three participating insurance adjusters. Mr. Karraker had
previously reported on March 21, 1997 that nearly every respondent was of the view that the
midpoint conference was preferable to the early conference because of a need for some discov-
ery prior to the conference. Many urged greater flexibility as to the timing of the conference.
MUSKIE INTERIM REPoRTs, supra note 146, at 11.
150. Surprisingly, of the lawyers responding to this Author's questionnaire who had experi-
enced the early conference (i.e., before discovery), the percentage of lawyers believing the con-
ference was too early was only 34.4%, and 52.2% were of the view that the conference was
appropriately timed. See Dana Thesis, supra note 145, at 65-67.
151. Id. at 59, table 22.
152. Id. at 62-64.
153. Kakalik II, supra note 62, at 36.
154. Dana Thesis, supra note 145, at 69.
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years earlier: Androscoggin (-3 weeks), Aroostook (-18.5 weeks), Kennebec (-2
weeks), Sagadahoc (-8.5 weeks). Similar reductions, however, were also observed
in the control counties of Oxford (-15 weeks) and Penobscot (-3 weeks). 15 5 Be-
cause the control counties also share in this reduction, it could be concluded that
factors such as the decline in pending cases 15 6 or the filling of judicial vacan-
cies 157 had a greater effect on this apparent statewide improvement in resolution
time than did the pilot project. The pilot project may have contributed, however,
by freeing limited judicial resources for other cases. 158 The RAND study also was
unable to detect any "strong statistical evidence" that mediation and early neutral
evaluation in the federal court affected "time to disposition."' 159
c. Increased the Likelihood of Settlement. After 29 months all four counties
in the pilot project experienced percentage increases in settlement rates over the
same counties three years earlier-Androscoggin (+13.3%), Aroostook (+10.6%),
Kennebec (+9.5%), and Sagadahoc (+23.5%). Additionally with only 89% of the
cases resolved, three out of four pilot project counties experienced higher settle-
ment rates than the same counties experienced after 100% of the cases were re-
solved during the historical period. By contrast, the settlement rate in the control
County of Oxford was almost unchanged over the rate achieved in the same county
three years earlier. The settlement rate in Penobscot, the other control County, was
the lowest of the six during the project period, but because of its dismal perfor-
mance in the historical period, it registered a significant improvement during the
project period. It was projected that 60 months after the pilot project began, settle-
ment rates in the pilot project counties improved over the historical period from
8% to 16%, a performance 10% to 13% better than the control counties. 16
d. Increased Party Participation and Satisfaction. In the typical court case,
settlement discussions take place out of the presence of the parties, either between
lawyers or between lawyers and the court. The pilot project brought the parties
directly into the process. The Muskie Institute questionnaire results suggest that
the parties viewed their involvement favorably. t61
e. Increased Administrative Costs in the Larger Counties but a Substantial
Reduction in the Number of Cases Requiring the Application of Judicial Resources
for Ultimate Resolution. Although clerks in Androscoggin and Kennebec Coun-
ties found that the pilot project substantially increased their workload, the clerks in
the two smallercounties, Aroostook and Sagadahoc, did not share this view. After
29 months comparing the project period with the historical period the reduction in
the percentage of cases requiring resolution by a court was substantial in all four
pilot project counties-Androscoggin (-31.6%), Aroostook (-47.7%), Kennebec (-
21.5%), and Sagadahoc (-33.5%). These reductions compare to a reduction of
29.3% in Oxford County and an increase of 42.1% in judicial resolutions in
Penobscot County.
155. Id. at48.
156. Id. at 44.
157. Id. at 38 n.119 and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 46, 49-52, 55.
159. Kakalik II, supra note 62, at 36.
160. Dana Thesis, supra note 145, at 54, table 19.
161. MUSKIE INTERiM REPORTS, supra note 146, at 4-7 (Jan. 14, 1997).
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f. Preserved the Court's Reservoir of Authority. As McGovern observed, any
resolution that does not require judges to decide preserves the Court's "sparse res-
ervoir of authority residing in our judges."'162 Indeed, percentage reductions from
20% to 50% in the number of judge-decided cases is a substantial conservation of
this resource. This is especially true if the Court is not directly involved in urging
the parties to settle. Importantly, none of the participants in the VNCs reported
being pressured into a settlement.
Based upon the results of the Pilot Project, the Author concluded that Maine
litigants and the court system would benefit from an ADR experience with the
following characteristics:
(a) a generally mandatory 163
(b) settlement, scheduling, 164 and mediation conference
(c) held typically, soon after discovery commences 16 5
(d) at which both substantive and procedural issues would be discussed
(e) with the parties and their lawyers and
(f) a neutral, other than a judge 166
(g) who would be selected, 167 trained 168 and compensated 169 by the court system
162. McGovern, supra note 23, at 13.
163. Dana Thesis, supra note 145, at 82. Exemptions would be available for all the reasons
permitted under the pilot project, including a failed previous attempt at ADR and a willingness
to engage in private ADR within the same time frame.
164. Id. Under close supervision of the judiciary, the Neutral would have the power to
propose orders for court review dealing with discovery, scheduling, and pretrial matters.
165. Id. Within certain parameters set by the judiciary, the timing of the conference would be
left to the Neutral and the parties. The parameters might include a bias for holding the confer-
ence as soon as the judiciary determines that constructive settlement discussions might be fruit-
ful.
166. Id. Two separate rationales exist for consciously excluding the judiciary from this
function. The first is that by national standards Maine's front-line judiciary is overworked. For
example, it was recently reported that:
[flor courts of general jurisdiction comparable to Maine's Superior Court, Maine ranks
47th in judges per 100,000 population: 1.3 compared to the average of 3.6 per 100,000
for all states ... [and] Maine has the fewest number of judges in courts of general
jurisdiction (16) of any of the 49 states surveyed ... [and w]hen compared to other
states, Maine ranked 5th in clearance rates for civil cases and 12th for criminal cases.
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COMPENSATION COMMISSION i, 2 (Me. 1996) (citing statistics provided by
the National Center for State Courts in 1995 and 1996).
The second rationale is to avoid the appearance of impropriety-a judge urging parties to
settle to avoid a trial or other expenditure of the court's time.
167. Dana Thesis, supra note 145, at 83. Selecting the Neutral for the parties was designed
to protect the growing profession of private mediators and dispute resolution professionals. Since
it was not anticipated that the system would be able to afford market rates, selecting the Neutral
at random from a list maintained by the court would encourage the parties who could afford to
select their own mediator at market rates.
168. Id. at 83. It was contemplated that each county would have relatively few trained
neutrals.
169. Id. at 83. Compensation should be sufficient to attract seasoned litigators and ADR
professionals to devote a significant amount of time to an undertaking that is, nevertheless, a
moderately paid public service.
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(h) to be financed by a legislative appropriation 170 or, alternatively, a diversion of
the $300 civil jury trial fee.
III. MANDATORY ADR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
Following the 1995-97 Superior Court Pilot Project and the evaluations by
this Author1 7 1 and the Muskie Institute, 172 and an unsuccessful attempt to interest
the Maine Legislature in providing funding for the cost of mediators, a divided
Supreme Judicial Court adopted Rule 16B 173 of the Maine Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to take effect on January 1, 2002.
The rule provides that in all non-exempt cases1 74 filed after January 1, 2002
the parties (or their lawyers) shall schedule an ADR conference with a neutral of
their choice to be held within 120 days of the issuance of the scheduling order
(which issues typically a few days after the answer is filed). In most cases, the
neutral's fee is established by the neutral and then apportioned or paid equally by
the parties. At the parties' election, the process may be mediation, early neutral
evaluation or non-binding arbitration. Although the court, for good cause shown,
may extend the time of the ADR conference past the 120-day deadline, it was
contemplated that conferences would be typically held approximately half way
through the normal discovery period.
When the Supreme Judicial Court adopted Rule 16B, it pledged to study its
effectiveness after a suitable period. As the Chair of the Court's ADR Committee
with the able assistance of my administrative assistant, Amber Davis, the Director
of the Court ADR Service (CADRES), Diane Kenty, and two interns, 175 the Au-
thor has been studying the effectiveness of Rule 16B, by comparing the progress
of the civil cases commenced during the first half of 2000 (before Rule 16B) with
the cases filed in the first half of 2002 (under Rule 16B) and the cases filed in the
first two months of 2003 (after the bench and bar had become more accustomed to
170. Id. at 83. Good ADR is not inexpensive. Additionally, overseeing the process can be
costly. While the system envisioned here would not have all of the record keeping aspects of the
pilot project, it would have some. Additional staff support in the larger counties would be
required. Excluding cases arising under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act,
Rule 80B and 80C, appeals from the District Court and real estate foreclosure actions, Superior
Court filings in FY '97 were 3,301. Superior Court-Civil Filings and Dispositions by Type of
Case (Table SC-5). If current civil filings in the Superior Court were to remain steady and
approximately two-thirds of the cases require a Neutral conference, the annual cost for the Neutrals
(at $300 per conference) would be $660,000 (3,300 x 2/3 x $300). If the parties so desire, they
would be able to retain at their own expense the neutral for subsequent sessions at the neutral's
market rate. Id. at 83 n.187.
171. See Dana Thesis, supra note 145.
172. See MAIMAN E" AL., supra note 133.
173. ME. R. Civ. P. 16(B). See Appendix A & B for a copy of the Rule and the Court's
statements of support and non-concurrence.
174. Id. Rule 16B(b) provides that the following cases are exempt from ADR: actions for
divorce (Rule 80), Forcible Entry and Detainer (Rule 80D), Small Claims Appeals (Rule 80L),
Review of Governmental Actions (Rule 80B), Review of Final Agency Actions (Rule 80C),
State Tax Assessor Appeals (ME. REV. STAT. AN. tit. 36, § 1151), actions in which parties have
already participated in ADR, actions for mortgage foreclosure or other secured transactions,
actions by prisoners, and small personal injury actions (i.e., $30,000 or less) if the plaintiff
requests the exemption, and in all other cases in which a party established good cause. Id.
175. J.T. Cooke of the University of Vermont Law School and Shane Wright of the Univer-
sity of Maine School of Law.
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Rule 16B). The Author also polled the lawyers and clients in a random sample
(10%) of the cases filed during the first half of 2002.
A. Introduction and Summary
The central findings of this study are that under Rule 16B, significantly more
cases are being resolved without the involvement of the courts (i.e., more settle-
ments), reducing in half the numbers of cases requiring judicial involvement for
their resolution. Cases exposed to Rule 16B are also resolving faster than their
pre-Rule 16B counterparts and the pace of those resolutions is picking up as the
bench and bar gain experience with Rule 16B. The support for these findings
follows.
In the sixteen counties, there were 1497 civil filings during the first half of
2002. Of those, 477 (32%) were exempt under the rule, leaving 1020, of which
246 did not have a scheduling order. This left 774 cases apparently ADR eligible;
however, 207 (27%) of those cases were resolved before an ADR conference was
less than a month in the future. This left 567 cases still ADR eligible. Of that
number, fifteen (3%) still had not experienced an ADR conference twenty-four to
thirty months after filing. This left 552 cases that experienced an ADR conference
or settled within thirty days of such a conference or settled within thirty days of a
judicial sanction for failing to conduct such a conference. 176 Of these cases, 254
(46%) cases settled immediately (defined as a resolution with docket entries within
thirty days of a scheduled ADR conference or an order to submit to one). The
balance of 298 (54%) did not settle immediately, but 213 (39%) have since settled.
Thus, 85% of the 552 cases exposed to an ADR conference had settled as of July 1,
2004.
Although, as defined above, 552 cases experienced an ADR conference or
settled within thirty days of such a conference or settled within thirty days of a
judicial sanction for failing to conduct such a conference, only 509 actual confer-
ences occurred. If we remove the cases that settled in the wake of a court order to
conduct a conference (twenty-three) and those cases that settled on the eve of a
scheduled conference (twenty), we can study just the impact of the conferences
rather than the operation of Rule 16B. Of the 509 actual conferences, 211 (41%)
immediately settled (i.e., within thirty days of the conference) and, as of July 1,
2004, another 213 (42%) have since settled. Thus, as of July 1, 2004, 83% of the
cases that experienced a Rule 16B conference have settled. The county-by-county
numbers are set out in Table I.
176. In New Hampshire, where they have had mandatory ADR in the Superior Court for
about twelve years, they count as ADR-induced settlements cases that settle within 30 days
before or after a scheduled conference. Maine has expanded that definition to include as ADR-
induced settlements, those cases that settle within 30 days of an order to conduct ADR or a
judicially imposed sanction for not doing so. As of July 1, 2004, twenty-three of the settlements
had been judicially induced and 20 occurred within thirty days of a scheduled conference.
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As of July 1, 2004, of the 552 cases experiencing anADR conference, 177 466
(85%) had settled; thirty-two (6%) had resolved by a dispositive motion or bench
trial; twenty-three (4%) had resolved by a jury trial; and thirty-one (5%) remain
unresolved. Combining these 552 cases and the 207 cases that resolved before a
conference and the fifteen eligible and open cases that had not had a conference
generates Table II, a progress report on all the ADR eligible cases as of July 1,
2004.
177. Including those cases settling within thirty days of such a conference or within thirty
days of a judicial sanction for failing to conduct such a conference.
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For the comparable period in 2000 there were 783 cases with a scheduling
order that would not have been exempt under Rule 16B. 178 Without the benefit of
Rule 16B as of July 1, 2004 (i.e., after forty-eight to fifty-four months) 596 (76%)
had settled; 134 (17%) had resolved by a dispositive court order or bench trial;
forty-six (6%) required a jury trial; and seven (1%) remain unresolved.
In Table III we compare the data for 2000 and 2002.
TABLE III
2000 2002
Settled 596 (76%) 636 (84%)
Dispositive Motions 134 (17%) 52 (7%)
Jury Trials 46 (6%) 25 (3%)
Unresolved 7 (1%) 46 (6%)
Cases ADR Eligible with a 783 (100%) 759 (100%)
Scheduling Order
Until recently, one could not be certain whether the increase in the number of
early settlements meant that cases that were always going to settle were just set-
tling sooner. In the 1995-97 pilot project, the increase in the number of early
settlements did proceed a significant increase in the percentage of cases that ulti-
mately settled, e.g., in the early control period roughly 75% of the cases settled,
but 85% of the cases settled in the pilot project. This proportionately modest in-
crease in settlements, however, produced a 40% decrease in the percentage of cases
requiring judicial involvement in their resolution, e.g., from 25% to 15%.
We can now say that Rule 16B is replicating that earlier finding. If none of the
unresolved 2002 cases settle, Rule 16B has made a significant contribution to the
work of the Superior Court. If only half the remaining cases settle, Rule 16B has
almost cut in half the percentage of cases requiring court involvement in their
resolution, i.e., from 23% to 14%.179 Because most of its costs are fixed, the
impact of such a contribution does not produce any financial savings to the court
system. The real savings for the system are in freeing up scarce judicial and cleri-
cal resources for tackling other work within the system. The savings for the liti-
gants, while real, are difficult to quantify.
178. This figure excludes seven bankruptcies, five defaults, five Rule 41(b) dismissals, four
miscellaneous dismissals, and two changes of venue.
179. Indeed, as of March 22, 2005, of the forty-six cases pending on July 1, 2005, twelve
more had settled, nine had resolved in a bench trial or dispositive motion, one resolved by jury
trial, and twenty-four remained pending. Thus, as of March 22, 2005, 649 (85.5%) had settled,
sixty (8%) had resolved by bench trial or dispositive motion, twenty-six (3.4%) had resolved in
a jury trial, and twenty-four (3.2%) remained undecided.
20051
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The reader may ask, however, is it altogether fair to evaluate a change just as
the change is being implemented? In order to test whether the bench and bar's
collective experience with Rule 16B is evolving, we have also been following the
progress of the cases filed during the first two months of 2003.
Between January 2, 2003 and February 28, 2003, there were five hundred case
filings in the Superior Court. 149 were exempt under the Rule, and an additional
sixty-four lacked a scheduling order. This left 287 ADR-eligible cases, but sixty-
nine cases resolved before a conference and fourteen cases are still waiting for
their conference. Therefore, as of July 1, 2004, 204 cases experienced an ADR
conference. Of those 204, one hundred (49%) settled immediately, 180 a slight
improvement from the 2002 settlement percentage of 46%. Of the remaining 104
cases that did not settle immediately, as of July 1, 2004, fifty-nine have settled, ten
have resolved by a dispositive motion, seven resolved in a jury trial, and twenty-
eight were unresolved. Thus, as of July 1, 2004, 78% of the 2003 cases that expe-
rienced a Rule 16B conference had settled. The county-by-county numbers are set
forth in Table IV.
180. See supra note 177.
[Vol. 57:2
2005]
a
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN MAINE 383
ON - ~ -N t (ON 00
kn 'IC 00 1O -
- j-. ''N
O\0
N 00 NONON
CO - - I 0 c 1
0
en (100 cf SIN r- Cl
r. 7 (1 - l t-
of I- 'C1 00 01 00 N,
O n (1-1')0
C
.ON - ° 000 0 ('
to - -
to (1) u U
> U C> u 0 <6 .
.. In I.,-o ) 0u- u, uW~~C
MAINE LAW REVIEW
0-
o - 0-c
0
0
CD) -
0
0
.4 1- 6
>U U -
[Vol. 57:2
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN MAINE2005]
Cu.Cu
CuCu
Cu
CuCuI-Cu
.4-Cu0U
Cu
CuI-0.4-Cu.0
"CuCu
enCuI-enCu
CuC.)
Cu
..Cu
0
CuU
CuCu.4--
Cu-0
.~CuCuCuCuCu ~
Cu
en ~'
0~~
4)Cu
enC.)CuCuend)Cu~o ~
r~ Cu
o 0o 0C~I Cu
Cu .~
~Cu
4)
,0 Cu
0>
0 Cu
Cu
~ Cu
Cl C.)
~Cu- Cu0.-0
enCu
00
Cu
d)
to
CCA
- 0
C*
u
000
Cuu
Cu
Cu0
"CuCuCu
L
00~Cu
Cu
Cu
Cu
0
Cu
Cu
Cu
0
C..
Cu
en
en
0
"CuCuCu
CuCu
Cu"Cu
CuCu0
"CuCu
C.)
Cu
Cu0
en00~
Cu
0Cu
Cu
Cu
CuC.)
C..
Cu
enCu
"CuCuCu 0
-~ Cu
CuL.
Cu 0 "
[Vol. 57:2MAINE LAW REVIEW
o r- Cf
000
\40 qt
k 0 ) 0
~~(u 0~o\CV~ A
o j m*o '-i'-
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN MAINE
Note that with 15% of the 2003 cases still unresolved, the percentage of 2003
cases settled as of July 1, 2004, equals the percentage of 2000 cases settled as of
July 1, 2004. If the remaining 15% resolve in anything approaching a historical
pattern, the ultimate settlement percentage of the 2003 cases we are following will
equal, if not exceed, the settlement percentage of the 2002 cases. 18 1 It is therefore
evident that Rule 16B has caused a significant and permanent change in the resolu-
tion patterns of the Superior Court.
B. Does It Seem To Matter When the Conferences Are Held?
The data from the cases filed during the first six months of 2002 provides
modest support for those who argue that the later in the process the conference is
held, the more likely there will be a settlement. The 2003 data, however, under-
mines that support.
Pursuant to Rule 16B, in the absence of a court-ordered delay, the conferences
are supposed to occur within 120 days of the scheduling order, which issues shortly
after the answer is filed. 182 Looking first at the cases filed in 2002, as set forth in
Table VII below, if one looks at the results of only the conferences (ignoring the
impact of settlements on the eve of a conference or settlements immediately fol-
lowing a court order to have a conference), 269 (53%) of the conferences were
held within 120 days of the scheduling order. Of those 104 (39%) resulted in an
immediate settlement. Of the 241 conferences held after 120 days from the sched-
uling order, 106 (44%) resulted in an immediate settlement. Of the 154 confer-
ences held after 150 days following the scheduling order, seventy-four (48%) re-
sulted in an immediate settlement. Of the ninety-eight conferences held after 180
days following the scheduling order forty-nine (50%) resulted in an immediate
settlement. Of the sixty-six cases held after 210 days following the scheduling
order thirty-six (55%) resulted in an immediate settlement. Of the fifty confer-
ences held after 240 days following the scheduling order, twenty-six (53%) re-
sulted in an immediate settlement. Of the thirty-seven conferences held after 270
days following the scheduling order nineteen (5 1%) resulted in an immediate settle-
ment. Of the twenty-six conferences held after 300 days following the scheduling
order thirteen (50%) resulted in a settlement.
If we factor in the settlements brought about (we believe) by the prospect of a
settlement conference (twenty-four) and by a court order to hold a conference (eigh-
teen), the early percentages improve. Note, however, that the conferences held
after seven months of discovery tend to settle about 57% of the time, while those
conferences held within the first seven months of discovery settle about 44% of
the time. This data provides some support for those who suggest that conferences
held after full discovery will more likely result in immediate settlements.
181. Indeed, as of March 22, 2005, of the forty-two cases pending on July 1, 2004, seventeen
had settled, seven had resolved in a bench trial or dispositive motion, five had resolved by a jury
trial, and thirteen were still pending. Thus, as of March 22, 2005, of the 283 eligible cases filed
during the first two months of 2003, 233 (82%) had settled, twenty-five (9%) had resolved by
dispositive motion or bench trial, twelve (4%) had resolved as a result of ajury trial, and thirteen
(5%) remained undecided.
182. ME. R. Civ. P. 16B(a).
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But if we fast forward to the cases filed in the first two months of 2003, that
slight support for delaying all conferences disappears. In Table VIII below we see
that the settlement percentage is very stable. The immediate settlement percentage
is about 43% without regard to when the conferences are held and the percentage
jumps to 49% when we factor in the settlements that occur on the eve of the con-
ference or following a court order to hold a conference. Note, also, that the confer-
ences held after seven months of discovery tend to settle about 35% of the time,
while those conferences held within the first seven months of discovery settle about
45% of the time. The detail appears in Table VIII.
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The 2003 cases provide little support for the view that later is better. Eighty-
five (46%) of the conferences were held within 120 days of the scheduling order
which is down from the 53% for the 2002 cases. Otherwise the settlement rate (if
any trend can be discerned) seems to decline over time. The data from both 2002
and 2003 may provide support for the current approach: presumptively scheduling
the conference early but authorizing postponement for good cause.
If, however, for each period one were to add to the percentage of cases that
settle immediately (collectively 46%) the percentage of cases that subsequently
settle (collectively an additional 38% as of July 1, 2004) and then smooth out, the
monthly fluctuations by using a three month moving average for the 2002 cases
would produce Table IX.
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Table IX again provides some support for the view that it is possible to hold
the mediation too soon and that by doing so it may reduce the chance of ultimately
settling. Cases that conference in the first four months following the scheduling
order settle one or two percentage points below the mean. Conversely, those cases
that conference eight and twelve months following the scheduling order appear to
settle on the average a few percentage points above the mean.
Again, this pattern is not observable in the cases filed in early 2003. See Table
X.
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C. Do the Settlement Rates Vary Depending Upon The Type of Case?
From Table XI, it would appear that some types of actions are more likely than
others to benefit from mandatory mid-discovery ADR. Based upon plaintiff
counsel's characterization of the nature of the complaint, the Author has compared
settlement conference rates depending upon the type of case. In order to maximize
the size of the sample the 2002 and 2003 cases have been combined. The sample
sizes for many types of cases are large enough to conclude that auto negligence
(52%), contract (45%), other negligence (43%), other personal injury torts (46%),
other statutory actions (59%), and property negligence (53%) all appear to be rea-
sonable prospects for Rule 16B.
[Vol. 57:2MAINE LAW REVIEW
TABLE XI
Type of Case Settled Not Settled Percent
Settled
Assault 5 6 45%
Auto Negligence 150 138 52%
Boundaries 4 0%
Constitutional/Civil Rights 1 8 11%
Contract 48 59 45%
Damages 1 100%
Declaratory Judgment 11 16 41%
Easements 2 4 33%
Equitable Relief 3 1 75%
Equitable Remedies 2 8 20%
Gen. Injunctive Relief 2 3 40%
Libel/Defamation 2 3 40%
Mechanics Lien 3 6 33%
Nuisance 1 2 33%
Other Civil 7 16 30%
Other Equitable Relief 3 0%
Other Negligence 21 28 43%
Other Non Personal 5 7 42%
Injury Tort
Other Personal Injury Tort 19 22 46%
Other Real Estate 1 4 20%
Other Statutory Actions 10 7 59%
Partition 3 1 75%
Personal Injury 1 100%
Products Liability 2 5 29%
Property Negligence 36 32 53%
Quiet Title 2 8 20%
Trespass 6 6 50%
Unfair Trade Practices 7 7 50%
TOTAL 351 404 46%
By consolidating the types of cases under the broad headings listed below, it
is evident that: statutory actions (55%), torts (50%), and contract disputes (42%)
are excellent prospects for mandatory mid-discovery ADR, while other types of
cases appear less amenable to the process.
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TABLE XII
Type of Case Settled Not Settled Percent
Settled
Personal Injury/Property 240 238 50%
Damage/Tort
Libel/Defamation 2 3 40%
Contract/Declaratory 66 90 42%
Judgment/Gen. Injunctive
Relief/Equitable Relief
Constitutional/Civil Rights 1 8 11%
Statutory Actions 17 14 55%
Misc. Civil Cases 7 16 30%
Real Estate 18 35 34%
TOTAL 351 404 46%
D. What Process was Selected?
Of the cases filed in the first half of 2002, 509 cases actually had a conference.
For those conferences, mediation was selected 490 times, early neutral evaluation
was selected thirteen times and arbitration was selected only six times. Mediation
resulted in an immediate settlement 41% of the time, early neutral evaluation re-
sulted in an immediate settlement 15% of the time, and non-binding arbitration
resulted in settlements 67% of the time.
Of the cases filed in the first two months of 2003, 182 had a conference as of
July 1, 2004. All but one were mediations-the other was an early neutral evalu-
ation. 183
E. What Do We Know About the Neutrals Selected?
Pursuant to Rule 16B(d)(1), promptly after the answer is filed, "the parties
shall confer and select.., a neutral third party to conduct the [ADR] process." As
virtually all parties were represented by counsel, it is perhaps not surprising that
lawyers were selected as neutrals 96% of the time.1 84 Although 13% of the neutrals
selected were women, women were selected as neutrals only 5% of the time. 185
Although the court system maintains rosters of neutrals that satisfy certain educa-
tional and experiential qualifications, non-rostered lawyers were selected almost
27% of the time.
For 509 of the conferences, the parties selected ninety-one different neutrals.
The rostered neutrals and the non-rostered neutrals each settled 41% of the cases
they handled. Three of the most active non-rostered neutrals settled 55% of their
cases. The remaining thirty-seven non-rostered neutrals settled only 27% of their
cases.
183. In two other cases the parties selected arbitration, but in one case a bankruptcy pre-
cluded arbitration and in the other the parties settled before the scheduled arbitration.
184. For the cases filed in the first two months of 2003, lawyers were selected 98% of the
time.
185. For the cases filed in the first two months of 2003, 11% of the neutrals selected were
women; women were selected 5% of the time.
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Twenty of the ninety-one neutrals conducted ADR in four or more cases.
Collectively, those twenty conducted ADR in 409 (81%) of the cases. The busiest
four conducted 230 (45%) ADR sessions. The next busiest four conducted ninety-
two (18%). As a group, the most active twenty had a settlement rate of 47%.
Those who handled three or less had a combined settlement rate of 25%. Aver-
ages, however, can be misleading. Even among the busiest eight, settlement ratios
ranged from a low of 33 % to a high of 71%. Among the busiest twenty, settlement
rates went from a low of 0% to a high of 83%. Overall, the settlement rates varied
from 0% (forty-five) to 100% (sixteen). There is no evidence that neutrals are
being selected because they are both inexpensive and ineffective.
Looking at immediate settlement rates can be misleading. Most cases ulti-
mately settle. Indeed, 76% of the 2000 cases settled without the assistance of Rule
16B. The pilot project demonstrated that early or mid-discovery mandatory me-
diation can boost this ultimate percentage by 12% to 14%.
Table I reveals that as of July 1, 2004, 84% of the 2002 cases exposed to mid-
discovery ADR had settled, and that percentage is likely to climb as the thirty-one
open cases (5.6%) resolve. 186 The Author has been tracking both the immediate
and the subsequent settlement rates by mediator. Table XIII below sets forth the
immediate and current settlement rates (as of July 1, 2004) for the ten busiest
neutrals for the cases filed during the first half of 2002. The data indicates that
immediate settlement rates are not a very good predictor of ultimate settlement
rates, or, put another way, a mediation before a competent mediator may be only
the beginning of a process that ultimately leads to settlement.
TABLE XIIH
Roster Number of Mediator Immediate 7/1/04
Cases Settlement Settlement
Percentage Percentage
79 A 37% 92%
/ 69 B 43% 87%
/ 42 C 69% 93%
/ 40 D 40% 95%
30 E 43% 67%
23 F 57% 87%
21 G 71% 86%
/ 18 H 33% 83%
/ 14 I 43% 93%
/ 12 J 83% 92%
For the cases filed during the first two months of 2003, as of July 1, 2004,
fifty-seven neutrals held 183 ADR sessions (all but one being a mediation). The
busiest four (not the same four as in 2002) accounted for 39% of the sessions,
186. Between July 1, 2004, and March 22, 2004, seventeen of the thirty-one cases pending on
July 1, 2004, resolved: nine as a result of a bench trial or dispositive judgment, seven as a result
of a settlement, and one jury trial. Thus, as of March 22, 2005, 474 (86%) of the 552 cases
exposed to a 16B conference had settled, 40 (7%) had resolved by a bench trial or dispositive
motion, 24 (4%) had resolved as a result of a jury trial, and 14 (2.5%) remained unresolved.
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down from 45% for 2002. The next busiest four (again, not the same four) ac-
counted for 17% of the sessions, down slightly from the 18% in 2002. The busiest
twenty in 2003 handled 76% of the ADR sessions, down from 81% from the twenty
busiest neutrals (not the same twenty) in 2002. While the twenty busiest neutrals
in 2002 conducted ADR sessions in 81% of the cases, the twenty busiest neutrals
in 2003 held ADR sessions in only 67% of the cases, indicating that the work is
spreading out. The twenty busiest neutrals in 2002 had a combined immediate
settlement rate of 47% (from 0% to 83%). The twenty busiest neutrals in 2003 had
a combined immediate settlement rate of 51%. Six of the busiest twenty in 2003
were not among the busiest in 2002. Overall, immediate settlement rates for the
2003 cases ranged from a low of 0% (twenty-nine) to a high of 100% (seven).
F What Has Been the Impact on Resolution and Settlement Rates?
There have been two prior experiments with ADR in the superior court. For
eighteen months in 1988-90 approximately 15% of the non-domestic civil filings
in the superior court in Knox and York counties had an ADR conference soon after
the filing of the answer. 187 For two years commencing on July 1, 1995, qualifying
cases filed in four counties experienced a mandatory ADR conference either be-
fore discovery (Androscoggin and Aroostook) or halfway through discovery
(Kennebec and Sagadahoc). 188 In the 1995-97 experiment, county settlement and
resolution rates were compared with settlement and resolution rates for those same
counties two years earlier and contemporaneously with two "control" counties
(Oxford and Penobscot). Because Rule 16B is now operating statewide, there is
no contemporaneous control available. There are, however, court records of cases
filed during the first half of 2000 that the Author has used as a control for the
performance of Rule 16B.
Both the settlement rate (percentage of cases settling) over time and the reso-
lution rate (percentage of cases resolving by whatever means) over time were com-
pared for the non-exempt cases with a scheduling order filed within the first six
months of 2000 and 2002 and the first two months of 2003. Set out below are
computer-generated graphs portraying this information for Maine's six largest coun-
ties (Androscoggin, Aroostook, Cumberland, Kennebec, Penobscot, and York), and
because there were not enough cases filed in the other ten counties during January
and February of 2003, the combined data for three regional groupings:
(1) Oxford, Franklin, Somerset, and Piscataquis counties;
(2) Sagadahoc, Lincoln, Knox, and Waldo counties; and
(3) Hancock and Washington counties.
On the vertical axis, the percentage of cases settling or resolving was plotted against
the horizontal axis, the number of months from the date of the scheduling order.
The denominator of the fraction that generates each line is the sum of all non-
exempt cases with a scheduling order filed during the two six-month periods and
the one two-month period under study (2000, 2002, and 2003; 783, 744, and 287,
respectively). The numerator for the settlements fraction includes all the cases
that settled by the end of that month. The numerator for the resolutions fraction is
187. For a more comprehensive explanation of the pilot project, see supra Part I.C.
188. See supra Part II.D.
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all the cases that were closed for whatever reason by the end of that month.189 At
the base of each settlement chart the timing of the settlements is indicated in the
following way: before a conference (C); at a conference or within thirty days of a
scheduled conference or a court order to attend a conference (R); more than thirty
days after an "unsuccessful" conference (U/C); or a partially successful confer-
ence (P/C).
Resolutions of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Androscoggin County
--- 2003
-4*2002
-..- 2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 1t121314 1516 1718192021 22232425262728293031 323334353637383940 142u4344
2003 -20 out of 22 cases
2002 -68 out of 69 cases
2000 = 90 out of 90 cases
7/1/04
Settlements of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Androscoggin County
2003
-. s-2002
2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
2003 = 18 out of 22 cases (R = 10, U/C = 5, C = 3)
2002 = 60 out of 69 cases (R = 27, U/C = 19, P/C = 2 C
12)
2000 = 73 out of 90 cases
189. Note that in order to compare cases that were filed throughout each period under study,
all the cases were analyzed as though they received their scheduling order on the first day (as
represented by the origin of the graph).
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Resolutions of Non Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Aroostook County
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Settlements of No-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Otdr
Aruostook County
--- 2003
-&-2000
--- r-2000
2003 = 12 nut of 16 cec (R = 10, C = 2)
2002 = 29 o of 36 cces (R = 19, U/C = 4, P/C = 1, C = 5)
20D0 = 33 eat of 48 canes
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Resolutions of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Cumberland County
[Vol. 57:2
-4-2003
-*-2002-e-2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9101112131415161718 19202122232425262728293031 323334353637353940414243444
2003 = 74 out of 82 cases
2002 = 182 out of 189 cases
2000 = 167 out of 167 cases
7/1/04
Settlements of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Cumberland County
-@-- 2003
-- 01"-2002
-42000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142
2003 = 64 out of 82 cases (R = 21, U/C = 20, P/C - 2, C = 21)
2002 = 161 out of 189 cases (R = 58, U/C = 56, P/C = 5, C = 42)
200 0- 124 out of 167 cases
7/1/04
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Resolutions of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Hancock & Washington Counties
-4.-2003
.- _2002
-.,1,2000
2003=22 out of 25 cases
2002 42 uat of 42 cases
2000 =49outof50 cases
7/1/04
Settlements of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Hancock & Washington Counties
-4-2003
-.- 2002
- -- 2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 32 13 14 15 16 17 0 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
2003 16 out of 25 cases (R 8, U/C 3, C 5)
2002 = 33 out of42 cases (R = 6, U/C = SC -19)
2000 = 31 out of 50 cases
7/1/04
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Resolutions of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Kennebec County
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#- 2003
-- 2002
--- 2000
2003 20 out of 26 cases
2002 61 out of 69 cases
2000 77 out of 77 cases
7/1104
Settlements of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Kennebec County
-*-- 2003
-0-2002
2000
2003 19 out of 26 cases (R = 9, U/C 5, C = 5)
2002 = 51 out of 69 cases (R = 17, UIC = 15, PIC = 1, C
= 19)
2000 = 53 aot of 77 cases
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Resolutions of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Oxford, Franklin, Somerset & Piscataquis Counties
-- +2003
-- 2002
-a-2000
2003 = 23 out of 24 cases
2002 = 75 out of 77 cases
2000 = 78 out of 79 cases
7/1/04
Settlements of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Oxford, Franklin, Somerset & Piscataquis Counties
-0-2003
-- a-2002
-t-2002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1415 16 17 18 19 2021 22 2324 25 2627 28 2930 31 32 33 3435
2003 = 20 out of 24 cases (R = 9, U/C = 5, C = 6)
2002 = 63 out of 77 cases (R = 25, U/C = 21, PIC = 4, C
- 13)
2000 = 61 out of 79 cases
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Resolutions of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Penobscot County
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-- 2003
-0-2002
-4_2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2324 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 3435 36 37 3839 4 41 42 43
2003 22 out of 24 cases
2002 73 out of 78 cases
2000 86 out of 90 cases
7/1/04
Settlements of Non-Exempt Coxes After a Schedulng Order
Penobscot County
--- 2003
---W-2002
-2000
i z • ) i lu t t 1- 111 t1 1S l. 112 2t Is2 24 1 11 21  3o 1 13 4 11 36 37 3s 394 4 4
2003 16 out of 24 caes (R = 7, U/C 5, C = 5)
2002 = 64 out of 78 rases (R = 29, U/C = 12, PIC = 1, C
= 22)
2000 = 65 out of 90 caes
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN MAINE
Resolutions of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Sagadahoc. Lincoln, Knox & Waldo Counties
-- 2003
a-U-2002
-&-2000
1 2 3 4 5 67 8 9011121 34l5161718192122232425262972u2930313233435363738394041424344546474 5o55s 2
2003- 18 out of 21 cases
2002 = 68 out of 79 cases
2000 = 73 out of 73 cases
711/04
Settlemnts of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
Sagadahoc, Lincoln, Knox & Waldo Counties
-4--2003
-N-2002
=..=2000
i 34 567 x I 12 I 1s 9. . .22 26a27I28 9 3132 3333536 37 38 39 404142a43IU45l46474849505152
2003 = 16 out of 21 cases (R = 7, UIC = 7, C 2)
2002 = 63 out of79 cases (R = 30, U/C = 16, P/C= 1, C
16)
2000 = 55 out of 73 cases
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Resolutions of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
York County
- 2003
--- 2002
-&- 2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12t13 14t15 16t7 18 19202122u23245a272329 30313233 3435363- 3394041 4243 4 4748 5 05152 53
2003 = 36 out of 47 cases
2002 128 out of 135 cases
2000 132 out of 132 cse.s
71/ 2004
Settlements of Non-Exempt Cases After a Scheduling Order
York County
-;4.2003
--- 2002
-6-2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 11121314 151617i192021222324252627282930313233 343533733839441243 4456 4a49050515253
2003 36 out of 47 ases (R = 19, U/C = 8, PIC = 1, C = 8)
2002 110 out of 135 cases (R = 43, U/C = 42, PIC = 6, C
19)
2000 - 99 out of 132 cases
As an illustration, study the two graphs for Androscoggin County. The settle-
ment graph reveals that it took thirty-six months to settle approximately 80% of
the 2000 cases, but only nineteen months to settle the same percentage of 2002
cases, and only sixteen months to settle 80% of the 2003 cases. Looking at the
same graph, one can see that after sixteen months 54% of the 2000 cases had
settled, 62% of the 2002 cases had settled, and 81% of the 2003 cases had settled.
The Androscoggin resolution graph reveals that all of the 2000 cases had re-
solved after forty-six months but all of the 2002 cases were resolved after just
twenty-nine months. It took seventeen months for the 2003 cases to reach a reso-
lution rate of 91%, three months ahead of the pace set by the 2002 cases and seven
months ahead of the pace of the 2000 cases.
Generally speaking, the cases filed in 2003 are settling and resolving faster
than the cases filed in 2002, and the cases filed in 2002 are settling and resolving
faster than the cases filed in 2000.
Table XIV displays the settlement and resolution percentages for the 2000,
2002, and 2003 cases after each group has been pending for seventeen or eighteen
months.
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TABLE XIV
Settlement & Resolution Percentages
Months 2000 2002 2003 200 2002 2
Androscoggin 18 54% 62% 82% 68% 72% 91%
Aroostook 18 41% 75% 75% 44% 80% 75%
Cumberland 18 63% 72% 78% 79% 78% 90%
Kennebec 18 40% 64% 69% 55% 72% 72%
Penobscot 17 41% 68% 68% 49% 73% 92%
York 18 47% 69% 73% 49% 72% 73%
Northwest 17 47% 65% 79% 53% 73% 92%
(Oxford, Franklin,
Somerset,
Piscataquis)
Northeast 18 24% 60% 64% 28% 72% 84%
(Hancock,
Washington)
Mid-Coast 18 53% 60% 71% 64% 68% 77%
(Sagadahoc,
Lincoln, Knox,
Waldo)
AVERAGE 46% 66% 73% 54% 73% 83%
It is evident that not only is Rule 16B helping to resolve cases, but as the bench and
bar becomes acclimated to its operation, it also seems to be doing so sooner.
Because the last few cases to resolve tend to inflate the average, it is difficult
to compare average case durations until virtually all the cases have been resolved.
One can compare, however, the average length in days of the 2000 and 2002 cases
for those counties in which the cases have entirely (or all but entirely) resolved.
By doing so, it is possible to get a measure of the average reduction in case dura-
tion for the Rule 16B cases compared with those cases commenced in 2000. As of
July 1, 2004, all the 2000 and 2002 cases being followed had been resolved in six
counties and all but 3% to 5% resolved in two more. From this data one can
conclude that, on average, the time from scheduling order to resolution has been
reduced from 402 days to 263 days, a reduction of 139 days, or better than four-
and-a-half months. This represents an average reduction of 35%. Table XV dis-
plays the individual county data:
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TABLE XV
2000 7/1/04 2002 7/1/04 2000 days-
Percent Percent 2002 days
Completed Completed
Androscoggin 345 100% 236 100% 109
Franklin 466 100% 266 100% 200
Hancock 551 100% 335 100% 216
Lincoln 301 100% 204 100% 97
Oxford 366 97% 241 97% 125
Penobscot 416 96% 236 95% 180
Sagadahoc 415 100% 291 100% 124
Somerset 354 100% 295 100% 59
AVERAGE 402 263 139
G. What Has Been the Impact on the Superior Court's Civil Docket?
When lawyers and judges lament on the decline in the number of civil jury
trials, ADR generally, and Rule 16B in particular, are often blamed or given credit.
Although this decline has been observable in court records for eighty years, 19 0 it is
also possible that Rule 16B and judicial settlement conferences (on the eve of trial)
are contributing to this decline in the number of jury trials.
Between fiscal years 1988 and 1998, Maine court records indicate that the
number of civil jury trials fluctuated from a high of 256 (fiscal year 1988) to a low
of 123 (fiscal year 1992). In fiscal year 1998 (the last year for which the Court has
accurate statistics) the number was 177.
Up to this point in our study of Superior Court cases, the Author has been
focusing only on the half of the total filings that are or were eligible under Rule
16B. Because historic jury trial numbers are for the Superior Court as a whole, it
is necessary to expand the focus from the Rule 16B eligible cases to the entire
Superior Court civil docket. Of the 1497 civil cases filed in the Superior Court
between January 1, 2002 and June 30, 2002, 477 were exempt and an additional
246 non-exempt cases did not receive a scheduling order. Of those 723 cases, after
excluding defaults (forty-five), cases filed to authorize a foreign deposition (forty-
two), to approve a minor settlement (sixty-three), those dismissed for insufficient
service (twenty-one), removed to the United States District Court (thirty-six), trans-
ferred to another venue (three), opened in error (seven), and consolidated into an-
other case (one), 505 remained. Of those 505, as of July 1, 2004, 275 had settled,
152 were resolved by a bench trial or a dispositive motion (including sixty-nine
foreclosures), five were resolved by a jury trial and seventy-three remain open. If
these numbers are added to the comparable numbers from Table II, the reader can
get a snapshot of the progress of all the cases filed in the Superior Court during the
first half of 2002. This exercise is set forth in Table XVI.
190. Murray, supra note 60.
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TABLE XVI
Status of the Cases Filed in the Superior Court in the First Half of 2002
Exempt and/or ADR Eligible Combined
No Scheduling
Order
Settled 275 (54%) 636 (84%) 911 (72%)
Resolved-Disp Mo. or Bench 152 (30%) 52 (7%) 204 (16%)
Trial
Resolved-Jury Trial 5 (1%) 25 (3%) 30(2.4%)
Still Open 73 (15%) 46 (6%) 119 (9.4%)
Subtotal 505 (100%) 759 (100%) 1264 (100%)
Default 45 7 52
Foreign Deposition 42 42
Minor Settlement 63 63
Insufficient Service 21 4 25
Removed to USDC 36 1 37
Change of Venue 3 2 5
Opened in Error 7 7
Consolidated 1 1 2
TOTAL 723 774 1497
Although after two to two-and-a-half years the cases from this six-month pe-
riod have only generated thirty jury trials, there are still 119 cases (9%) yet to be
resolved.1 91 If none of the 119 end in a jury trial, then Maine would be experienc-
ing civil jury trials at the rate of sixty per year. If the number of jury trials gener-
191. The Judicial Branch has recently adopted case completion standards. For jury and non-
jury civil actions the standards are as follows:
50% to be resolved within twelve months of filing;
75% to be resolved within eighteen months of filing; and
99% to be resolved within twenty-four months of filing.
See Maine Judicial Branch Quarterly Report Trial Court Efficiency, 4 (November 1, 2004).
Of the 1497 civil cases filed during the first half of 2002, as of July 1, 2004, (i.e., after twenty-
four to thirty months from the filing) 7.5% (119 cases) of the 1497 cases filed during the period
under study were still pending. By December 31, 2004, the number of pending cases had been
reduced to seventy-four. Of those, nineteen were stayed due to a pending bankruptcy, four were
stayed by agreement of the parties and no service has been made in one case. This left fifty
active cases pending, or 3.3% of the 1497 cases that were filed at least thirty months and perhaps
as long as thirty-six months earlier. It is evident that, notwithstanding the impact of Rule 16B
and judicial settlement conferences, the Superior Court is not meeting its civil case completion
standards. Interestingly, almost 40% of the fifty pending cases from the first half of 2002 are
medical malpractice cases which are required by law to experience prelitigation screening and
mediation panels before they can proceed in Superior Court. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §
2851 (West 2004) et seq.
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ated out of the remaining 119 cases is proportionally four times greater than the
number generated from the 1149 cases that had resolved as of July 1, 2004, then
the cases from the first half of 2002 will be generating jury trials at an annual rate
of eighty-four per year-50% fewer than the previous low of 123 (1993) and ap-
proximately half the civil jury trials held in fiscal year 1998.192 Although all the
juries are not in, it does appear that Rule 16B and judicial settlement conferences
on the eve of trial are significantly reducing the number of civil jury trials in the
Superior Court.
Rule 16B appears to be impacting the work of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court (Law Court) as well. During the first half of 2002 when the Superior Court
was getting used to Rule 16B, the Law Court was deciding appeals from decisions
of the Superior Court with respect to cases that had been commenced in an earlier
time. During that six-month period, however, the Law Court decided forty-seven
civil appeals from the Superior Court that would have been Rule 16B eligible had
those cases been commenced in 2002. Two years later, in the first half of 2004, the
Law Court decided just twenty-seven cases that were Rule 16B eligible. This 43%
drop in Rule 16B eligible appeals is exactly what one would expect. After reduc-
ing the number of cases requiring court involvement in their resolution by half,
one would expect a similar reduction in the number of appeals. 19 3
H. To What Extent Have Judicial Settlement Conferences Contributed to the
Increase in Settlements?
Of the 1497 civil cases filed in the Superior Court in the first half of 2002,
approximately half were not exempt and received a scheduling order. As of July 1,
2004, of the 774 cases eligible for a Rule 16B settlement conference, a total of 636
had settled. Of those, 170 settled before a conference, 254 settled at the confer-
ence, and 212 settled after the conference. 194
Of the 298 cases that did not settle immediately, as of July 1, 2004, thirty-
seven cases also experienced a judicial settlement conference. Of those thirty-
seven cases, twenty-three immediately settled (i.e., within thirty days of the con-
ference), and six more subsequently settled. Of the remaining eight, there have
been two jury trials, one bench trial, and five cases were still pending as of July 1,
2004. Thus, of the 212 cases settling after the Rule 16B conference, the judicial
settlement conference was directly or indirectly responsible for twenty-nine (14%)
of those settlements.
Of the 636 settlements experienced as of July 1, 2004, including seven settle-
ments brought about by judicial settlement conferences held before a Rule 16B
conference, the thirty-six direct and indirect settlements amount to approximately
5.7% of the total settlements. Any analysis of the impact of Rule 16B on the work
192. Note that as of March 22, 2005, of the 119 cases pending on July 1, 2004: thirty had
settled; twenty-two had resolved by bench trial or dispositive motion; and only one had resolved
by a jury trial.
193. See supra Tables 111 and VI and accompanying text.
194. See supra Tables I and II and accompanying text.
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of the Superior Court must acknowledge the impact on settlement rates brought
about by the judicial conferences on the eve of trial. 195
I. What Has Been the Reaction of Lawyers, Clients, and Neutrals to Rule 16B?
In order to assess the attitudes of the participants towards mandatory ADR in
the Superior Court, the Author randomly selected 196 sixty-six of the 2002 cases
that experienced a Rule 16B ADR conference (or settled on the eve of one) and
sent a letter and questionnaire 197 to the 153 lawyers involved in those cases. More
than half (eighty-six lawyers) responded. 198 Accompanying the lawyer letter was
a letter from the Author to the client 200 and a questionnaire 199 for the client to
answer. Each lawyer was asked to forward the letter and questionnaire on to the
client. The Author also sent a letter 20 1 to the ten busiest neutrals who collectively
participated in over 68% of the 2002 conferences.
I. Lawyer Reaction
Better than 75% of the lawyers responding were generally favorable towards
Rule 16B, although about the same percentage wanted more lawyer control over
the timing of the conference and wanted the Court to impose a good faith require-
ment by rule.
Although 60% thought the ADR conferences were sometimes held too soon
and 13% found the process sometimes too expensive, the overwhelming majority
(74%) found that Rule 16B forces early evaluation, early settlement discussions,
and/or early resolutions. Most lawyers (71%) thought the benefits of Rule 16B
justified the expense. A more comprehensive summary of the lawyer responses is
set forth in Appendix E.
195. Of the non-exempt cases filed during the first half of 2002, as of March 22, 2005, there
have been thirty-seven Judicial Settlement Conferences of cases that had previously experi-
enced a Rule 16B conference. Of those thirty-seven, twenty-three settled immediately and nine
more have since settled, two cases were resolved by a jury trial, two were resolved in a bench
trial, and one remains open.
As of March 22, 2005, there have also been eight Judicial Settlement Conferences of non-
exempt cases filed in the first half of 2002 that had not experienced a Rule 16B conference. Of
those, six settled immediately, one subsequently settled, and one resolved at a bench trial.
196. We first selected every tenth case on the docket, but when a case selected had not
experienced an ADR conference, we selected the next case on the docket that did experience a
conference (or settled on the eve of one). The sample produced an over-representation of cases
that resolved as a result of the conference (i.e., 53% of sample compared to 46% for the popula-
tion). The sample also over-represented certain mediators and the number of cases that resolved
on the eve of the conference. We therefore removed ten cases from the sample that reduced the
percentage of settled cases to 46% of the sample, selecting for removal cases where mediators
relative involvement had been overrepresented. A more comprehensive summary of lawyer
responses is set out at Appendix E.
197. See infra Appendix C and D.
198. See infra Appendix E.
199. See infra Appendix F.
200. See infra Appendix G.
201. See infra Appendix I.
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2. Client Reaction
How many of the lawyers forwarded the letter and questionnaire to their cli-
ents is unknown. Forty-one clients responded: twenty-two plaintiffs, fifteen de-
fendants, and four other clients (three of the four were the same insurance ad-
juster).
Collectively, they reported twenty-two settlements as a result of the Rule 16B
conferences (all were mediations). 202 Twelve clients (seven plaintiffs, four defen-
dants, and one third-party) thought the conference was held too soon, twenty-three
clients (twelve plaintiffs, nine defendants and two third-parties) thought it was
timed just right, and four clients (three plaintiffs and one defendant) thought the
mediation was too late. Nineteen of the twenty-seven clients that thought that the
mediation was timed either appropriately or was too late, settled. Nine of the
twelve clients who thought the mediation was too early did not settle. The fifteen
clients (seven plaintiffs, seven defendants, and one third-party) who found the ben-
efit of the ADR conference worth the cost, settled. Thirteen clients (eight plaintiff,
three defendants, and two third-parties) of the fifteen (ten plaintiffs, three defen-
dants, and two third-parties) who found the benefit of the ADR conference not
worth the cost, did not settle. Six of the eleven clients (five plaintiffs, five defen-
dants and one third-party) who were not sure, settled. Twenty-eight of the clients
(sixteen plaintiffs, eleven defendants, and one third-party) were generally favor-
able to Rule 16B (eighteen of the twenty-eight settled); eleven clients (six plain-
tiffs, three defendants, and two third-parties) were not generally favorable to Rule
16B (5 of whom settled). Twenty-nine of the clients (seventeen plaintiffs, nine
defendants, and three third-parties) would leave the timing of the ADR conference
up to the lawyers (fifteen of the twenty-nine). 203 Nine of the clients (four plain-
tiffs, four defendants, and one third-party) would let the Court set the time (seven
of the nine settled). The clients had many other suggestions for improving Rule
16B.204
3. Neutral Reaction
Although ninety-one different neutrals were selected by the parties to mediate
the 2002 cases being followed, ten individuals mediated over 68% of them. They
were sent the letter that appears in Appendix I. As of July 1, 2004, seven of the ten
had responded. The neutrals' responses were as follows:
Is the Timing of the Conference Appropriate? One respondent would leave
the rule alone, one would hold the conference before the last two months of dis-
202. Twenty-three settlements out of forty-one responses, seems high. All things being equal
we would have expected fifteen settlements (i.e., 46%). Perhaps happier clients are more likely
to respond to surveys. Perhaps the responses include some settlements that occurred more than
thirty days after the conference that the client believed was caused by the Rule 16B conference.
203. Although it is perhaps understandable that lawyers would want to be in control of the
timing of the conference, it is less clear why twenty-four out of thirty-two clients who expressed
an opinion on this subject (fourteen of whom settled) would also want their lawyers in charge of
the timing. It may be that these clients have confidence in their lawyers and opposing counsel to
select the appropriate time by agreement; it may also reflect a belief that their lawyers did select
the proper time because of the ease with which attorneys are able to obtain extensions from the
court.
204. See infra Appendix H.
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covery, one would hold the conference after three depositions and a document
exchange, two would hold the conference prior to thirty days after discovery ends,
one would permit counsel to defer the conference by agreement until just prior to
the trial management conference, and one would leave it up to the mediator to
decide when the mediation should occur. Two of the mediators would permit the
lawyers to opt out of the ADR conference by agreement.
Should the Court System Adopt a Good Faith Standard? Four respondents
oppose adding a good faith requirement to Rule 16B, two (one of whom always
puts such a provision in his contract) believe it should be put in the rule. One
expressed no view on the issue. Three of the seven volunteered that the rule should
require insurance adjusters to attend the conference in person (two) or, at least, by
phone (one).
J. What are the Major Conclusions to be Drawn?
The foregoing data supports the conclusions set out below. Mandatory, mid-
discovery mediation:
1. Speeds up the pace of resolutions. In addition to lawyer perceptions, Table
XII reveals that 50% more cases resolved in the first year and a half under Rule
16B as had resolved in a year and a half during the pre-Rule 16B period (2000).
2. Shortens the time to final resolution. The evidence indicates that Rule 16B
has reduced the duration of the average case by four-and-a-half months or 35%.205
3. Increases the likelihood of settlement.. Lawyers correctly report that most
cases settle. Based on their experience and memories, many lawyers will provide
the listener with a number (i.e., "four out of five cases settle"; "95 % of cases settle;"
etc.). In Maine during 1992 (before the Pilot Project) and during 2000 (before
Rule 16B) only three out of four cases settled (e.g., during 2000, 76% settled and
24% required a decision by a court or a jury for a final resolution). With 6% of the
2002 cases still unresolved, under Rule 16B the settlement percentage has already
passed 83%. If the final settlement percentage approaches 86%, that will equate to
a 13% increase over the pre-Rule 16B settlement percentage. During the Pilot
Project, volunteer neutrals increased the settlement percentages in four counties
from 10% to 13%.
4. Reduces court involvement. A 13% increase in settlements equates to a
40% reduction in the cases requiring judicial involvement in their resolution. In
addition to the ability to redirect scarce judicial resources, this also preserves the
court's reservoir of authority. 206
5. May reduce party costs. In addition to the reasonable supposition that
cases that resolve quickly do not cost the parties as much as cases that linger, the
only evidence supporting this conclusion is that most of the lawyers responding to
the Author's questionnaire believed that Rule 16B saved resources.
K. Recommendations for the Future
Based upon our study of the pros and cons of ADR, the ADR pilot project, and
the operation of Rule 16B for two and a half years, the Author would approach any
change in Rule 16B with caution.
205. See Table XIV, supra Part III.F.
206. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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1. Do Not Convert to a Voluntary Program. There is no evidence supporting
a wholesale repeal of Rule 16B or converting Rule 16B into a voluntary program.
Rule 16B has been a constructive improvement in the processing of civil disputes
in the Superior Court.
2. Adjust the Timing of the Conference. Approximately 70% of the lawyers
and clients responding to the survey would leave the timing of the conference to
the lawyers, although about the same percentage of clients thought their confer-
ence was timed either appropriately or was too late. Most of the mediators re-
sponding to the survey would give the lawyers greater flexibility in delaying the
timing of the conference, although one feared that such flexibility would make
timing a subject of bargaining to the ultimate detriment of the weakest participant.
The objective evidence does not point to the need for greater flexibility in the
timing of the conference. If the Superior Court, however, is routinely granting
modest requests for extensions, perhaps the rule should be amended to' authorize
the parties to obtain an automatic extension of up to sixty days by filing a request
signed by all counsel.
3. Revisit the Exemptions. Because only one of nine cases involving consti-
tutional or civil rights settled in mediation, it might be argued that this type of case
deserves an exemption.20 7 Perhaps for the same reason, appeals of governmental
actions (Rule 80B and Rule 80C cases) should retain their exemptions. The Au-
thor suspects, however, that if a school board member, a planning board member,
or a member of the Board of Environmental Protection were required to attend a
mediation in cases in which their decisions were being appealed to the Superior
Court a significant number of those cases would settle. Perhaps the Law Court
should authorize a pilot project to test this thesis.
4. Reject a Good Faith Requirement. Because neutrals can and do provide in
their contracts that the parties agree to participate in good faith, the Author would
not recommend adding such a requirement to the Rule.
5. Cautiously Expand into the District Court. Many cases filed in the District
Court currently either require (i.e., family) or make available (i.e., small claims)
non-binding mediation. Because of power imbalances many other District Court
cases may not lend themselves to mandatory mediation. The Law Court, however,
should consider authorizing some pilot projects to assess whether Rule 16B should
be expanded to the general civil docket, especially when neither party is or both
parties are represented by counsel.
6. Expand ADR into the Probate Court. The Probate Court should consider a
pilot project to test the efficiency of Rule 16B on all or a portion of its docket.
7. Overall. After twenty-seven years of experimenting, implementing, and
evaluating, Maine is well on its way to fulfilling the promise of the Commission to
Study the Future of Maine's Courts to "offer citizens access to a variety of means
for resolving their disputes ...."208 Although the traditional method of resolving
disputes with or without a jury and with the right to appeal must always be avail-
able, the citizens of Maine deserve and are getting alternatives.
207. Only one of the eight cases, however, required the court's involvement for a resolution.
The other seven all settled after the conference and before trial.
208. COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 38.
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APPENDIX A
STATE OF MAINE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
AMENDMENTS TO MAINE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
TO IMPLEMENT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES IN SUPERIOR COURT
Effective January 1, 2002
Docket No. SJC- 11
1. Rule 16(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure is amended as follows:
RULE 16. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
(a) Scheduling Order. After the filing of the answer in any civil action in the
Superior Court other than proceedings pursuant to Rule 80, 80B or 80C, the court
shall enter a scheduling order setting deadlines for the joinder of additional par-
ties, the exchange of expert witness designations and reports, the scheduling and
completion of an alternative dispute resolution conference when required by Rule
16B. the completion of discovery, the filing of motions, and the placement of the
action on the trial list. The scheduling order shall not be modified except on mo-
tion for good cause shown. The joinder of additional parties after the scheduling
order has issued shall not require a modification of the scheduling order except on
motion for good cause shown.
2. Rule 16B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure is adopted as follows:
RULE 16B. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(a) Applicability. All parties to any civil action filed in or removed to the
Superior Court, except actions exempt in accordance with subsection (b) of this
rule, shall, within 60 days of the date of the Rule 16(a) scheduling order, schedule
an alternative dispute resolution conference which conference shall be held and
completed within 120 days of the date of the Rule 16(a) scheduling order.
(b) Exemptions. The following categories of cases are exempt from the
requirements of this rule:
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(1) Actions under Rule 80, 80D, and 80L;
(2) Appeals under Rule 80B or Rule 80C;
(3) Appeals under 36 M.R.S.A. § 151;
(4) Actions for recovery of personal injury damages where the plaintiff re-
quests exemption and certifies that the likely recovery of damages will
not exceed $30,000;
(5) Actions where the parties have participated in statutory prelitigation screen-
ing or dispute resolution processes including medical malpractice and
Maine Human Rights Act cases;
(6) Actions where the parties certify that they have engaged in formal alter-
native dispute resolution before a neutral third party. The certification
shall state the name of the neutral and the date(s) on which formal alter-
native dispute resolution conferences occurred;
(7) Actions for nonpayment of notes in mortgage foreclosures and other se-
cured transactions;
(8) Actions by or against prisoners in state, federal or local facilities; and
(9) Actions exempted by the court on motion by a party and for good cause
shown but only where the motion seeking exemption is filed within 30
days of the date of the Rule 16(a) scheduling order.
(c) Motions and Discovery. Motions and discovery practice shall proceed
in accordance with these rules while an alternative dispute resolution process is
being scheduled and held.
(d) Neutral Selection and Conference Scheduling.
(1) Promptly after the filing of an answer in the Superior Court or removal
from the District Court, the parties shall confer and select an alternate dispute
resolution process (that is, mediation, early neutral evaluation, or nonbinding
arbitration) and a neutral third party to conduct the process. If the parties cannot
agree on the ADR process, they shall proceed to mediation. If the parties cannot
agree on the selection of a neutral, they shall notify the court, which shall desig-
nate a neutral third party, with experience appropriate to the nature of the case,
from the appropriate roster of court neutrals developed by CADRES;
(2) Unless the court orders or the parties otherwise agree, fees and expenses
for the neutral shall be apportioned and paid in equal shares by each party, due
and payable according to fee arrangements worked out directly by the parties and
the neutral. Fees and expenses paid to the neutral shall be allowed and taxed as
costs in accordance with Rule 54(f). If any party is unable to pay its share of the
fees and expenses of the neutral, that party may apply for in forma pauperis sta-
tus pursuant to Rule 91. If granted, the court may allocate the fee among those
parties who are not in forma pauperis or ask the selected neutral to undertake the
conference on a reduced fee basis. Failing the consent of the selected neutral to
the reduced fee, the court will designate an alternate neutral from the roster de-
veloped by CADRES who will agree to undertake the assignment on a reduced
fee basis or pro bono.
(3) Once the neutral is selected or designated, the parties shall agree with
the neutral on a time and place for the conference. The plaintiff shall notify the
court of the name of the neutral and the time and place for the conference no later
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than 60 days after the date of the Rule 16(a) scheduling order. The conference
must be held and completed no later than 120 days after the date of the Rule 16(a)
scheduling order.
(e) Conference Issues. At the alternative dispute resolution conference, the
only required function is to conduct the ADR process selected by the parties. If at
the conclusion of that process and, after a serious effort by the parties, agreement
is not reached on all issues, then the neutral may proceed to a case management
discussion with the parties to try to reach agreement on the following: (i) identifi-
cation, clarification and limitation of remaining issues; (ii) stipulations; and (iii)
discovery-related issues;
The neutral should not address case management issues in cases that are spe-
cially assigned or subject to single judge management, except with the approval of
the assigned judge. When case management issues are addressed, the neutral may
not extend deadlines or otherwise modify directives in the scheduling order set
pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 16(a). An ADR conference need not be reconvened if,
after an initial session, the only remaining issues are case management issues.
(f) Conference Attendees.
(1) Conference attendees shall include:
(i) Individual parties;
(ii) A management employee or officer of a corporate party, with ap-
propriate settlement authority, whose interests are not entirely repre-
sented by an insurance company;
(iii) A designated representative of a government agency party whose
interests are not entirely represented by an insurance company;
(iv) An adjuster for any insurance company providing coverage poten-
tially applicable to the case, provided that the adjuster participate in the
conference with appropriate settlement authority;
(v) Counsel for all parties; and
(vi) Nonparties whose participation is essential to settlement discus-
sions-including lienholders-may be requested to attend the confer-
ence.
(2) The court may impose appropriate sanctions on any party or representa-
tive required and notified to appear at a conference who fails to attend.
(3) Attendance shall be in person, or in the discretion of the neutral, by
telephone.
(g) Conference Documents. If requested by the neutral, five days prior to
the conference, the plaintiff shall provide to the neutral:
-The complaint;
-The answer or other responsive pleading;
-Any pretrial scheduling statement;
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-Any pretrial order that may have issued; and
-Any dispositive motions and memoranda that have been filed in con-
nection with those motions.
(h) Conference Report and Order.
(1) Settlement. If the conference results in a settlement, the parties shall,
within 10 days after the conference, report that fact to the court and include a
proposed order concerning the settlement. The court shall order the appropriate
entry to be made on the docket.
(2) Neutral Report. If the conference does not result in a settlement, the neu-
tral shall, within 10 days after the conference, file with the court a report and, if
appropriate, a proposed order which indicates any agreements of the parties on
matters such as stipulations, identification and limitation of issues to be tried, dis-
covery matters and further alternative dispute resolution efforts. If there are no
agreements of the parties, the report shall so indicate. If the neutral does not file
the report, the parties shall prepare and file the report indicating their points of
agreement and disagreement. The parties shall be equally responsible for assuring
that the neutral's report is filed in a timely manner and may be subject to appropri-
ate sanctions if filing of the report is filed later than 130 days after the date of the
Rule 16(a) scheduling order.
(i) Jury Fee. For cases required to have an alternative dispute resolution
conference in accordance with this rule, payment of the civil jury fee required by
Rule 38(b), shall be deferred until 150 days after the date of the Rule 16(a) sched-
uling order. If the jury fee is not paid within the time required, any right to jury
trial shall be deemed waived and the case shall be scheduled on the nonjury list for
trial.
(j) Standards for Alternative Dispute Resolution. No agreement or order to
enter into alternative dispute resolution pursuant to this rule may be entered or
issued without consideration being given to the needs of indigent or unrepresented
parties or parties in situations where there is a potential for violence, abuse, or
intimidation.
(k) Confidentiality. A neutral who conducts an alternative dispute resolution
conference pursuant to this rule, or an alternative dispute resolution process pursu-
ant to subsection (b)(6), shall not, without the informed written consent of the
parties, disclose the outcome or disclose any conduct, statements, or other infor-
mation acquired at or in connection with the ADR conference. A neutral does not
breach confidentiality by making such a disclosure if the disclosure is: (i) neces-
sary in the course of conducting the dispute resolution conference and reporting its
result to the Court as required in (h)(2); (ii) information concerning the abuse or
neglect of any protected person; (iii) information concerning the intention of one
of the parties to commit a crime, or the information necessary to prevent the crime
or to avoid subjecting others to the risk of imminent physical harm; or (iv) as
otherwise required by statute or court order.
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(1) Sanctions. If a party or a party's lawyer fails without good cause to appear
at a dispute resolution conference scheduled pursuant to this rule, or fails to com-
ply with any other requirement of this rule or any order made thereunder, the court
may, upon motion of a party or its own motion, order the parties to submit to
alternative dispute resolution, dismiss the action or any part of the action, render a
decision or judgment by default, or impose any other sanction that is just and ap-
propriate in the circumstances. In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the
court shall require the party or lawyer, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney fees, of the opposing party, and any fees and expenses of a
neutral, incurred by reason of the nonappearance, unless the judge finds an award
would be unjust in the circumstances.
Dated: February 8, 2001
Is/DEW
Daniel E. Wathen
Chief Justice
Robert W. Clifford
/s/PLR
Paul L. Rudman
/s/HHD
Howard H. Dana, Jr.
Is/LIS
Leigh L Saufley
IsIDGA
Donald G. Alexander
/s/SC
Susan Calkins
Associate Justices*
Justice Robert W. Clifford does not concur.
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES
1. Subsection 1 amends Rule 16(a) to add an ADR scheduling component to
the scheduling order which the court now issues under Rule 16(a). The scheduling
order specifies the time within which the ADR conference has to be scheduled and
completed. As with other aspects of the 16(a) scheduling order, the dates for sched-
uling and completion of the ADR conference may be adjusted by the court for
good cause shown. The scheduling order would reference Rule 16B for imple-
mentation procedures.
2. Subsection 2 amends the rules to adopt a new Rule 16B generally covering
the ADR processes.
Subsection (a) directs all parties to civil actions either filed in the Superior
Court or removed from the District Court to the Superior Court, except exempt
actions, (i) to schedule an ADR conference within either 60 days of the date of the
Rule 16(a) scheduling order; and (ii) to hold that ADR conference within 120 days
of the same date.
The time limits in Rule 16B(a) are subject to M.R. Civ. P. 6(b) which allows
the court to enlarge a time limit "for cause shown." See also M.R. Civ. P. 16(a)
(allowing scheduling order modification "for good cause shown").
Subsection (b) exempts from the ADR requirements:
1. Divorce, Forcible Entry and Detainer, [Civil Violations,] and Small Claims
Actions.
2. 80B and 80C appeals.
3. State tax assessors appeals. Even though these actions are "de novo," 36
M.R.S.A. § 151, in fact they have been through an extensive discussion
process. Further, most of these matters that do get to Superior Court are
resolved on stipulations or cross-motions for summary judgment. Consider-
ing that the Superior Court often does not get these actions until they have
been in the administrative process for three or four years, an additional ADR
component would not appear to be productive.
4. Actions for recovery of personal injury damages where the plaintiff re-
quests exemption and certifies that the likely recovery will not exceed
$30,000. This exemption addresses the concern of many trial lawyers that
adding an ADR process may unacceptably increase the cost of prosecuting
cases where relatively small damages and fees may be recovered. The
exemption must be initiated by the plaintiff who thus could choose ADR
by not seeking exemption. The choice is limited to the plaintiff, as it is the
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plaintiff's potential recovery and any resulting contingent fee that may be
most impacted by ADR related cost increases.
The certification should be a good faith estimate by the plaintiff at the time
it is filed that likely recovery will not exceed $30,000. However, this
estimate does not preclude a plaintiff, at trial or in any other forum where
plaintiff's claim is addressed, from seeking and recovering more than
$30,000.
5. Actions where parties have already participated in statutorily required ADR
or prelitigation screening processes such as medical malpractice and Maine
Human Rights Acts cases. Cases where parties exempt themselves from
the prelitigation screening process in medical malpractice cases or pro-
ceed based on a right to sue letter, without the dispute resolution processes
of the Maine Human Rights Act, would be subject to the normal ADR
processes.
6. Actions where the parties certify that, prior to the time for answer or re-
moval, they already engaged in a formal ADR process before a neutral
third party. The certificate would be required to state the name of the
neutral and the date(s) on which the formal ADR process occurred.
7. Actions for non-payment of notes in mortgage foreclosures and other se-
cured transactions.
8. Actions by or against incarcerated persons.
9. Actions where a party demonstrates good cause to gain an exemption from
or a deferral of the ADR process. This reflects the choice that such exemp-
tions should not be automatic if the parties agree but only subject to court
approval based on "good cause." For instance, the parties may persuade a
court that "no ADR process is likely to deliver benefits to the parties suf-
ficient to justify the resources consumed by its use." ADR Local Rule 3-2
of the Northern District of Califomia. Compare the experience with me-
diation in small claims actions. If ADR is an economic hardship to one of
the parties and a pro bono neutral cannot be obtained, the court should
relieve the parties of this requirement. ADR, although highly desirable,
should not be a barrier to court access. The Rule requires that any such
exemption motion be filed within 30 days of the date of the Rule 16(a)
scheduling order to assure that such exemptions are seriously considered
and don't become a dilatory tactic for people that are late in getting around
to selecting a neutral and scheduling an ADR conference. An exemption
under 16B(b) is to be distinguished from a time limit extension that may
be sought pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 6(b) or 16(a).
Subsection (c) indicates that discovery and motion practice will proceed unaf-
fected by the ADR process. Presumably, if the parties agree, scheduling adjust-
ments can be made as contemplated in Me. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and 16(a).
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Subsection (d)(1) requires the parties to confer promptly after answer or re-
moval to select an ADR process and a neutral to conduct the process. If the parties
cannot agree on the process, mediation will be the process. If the parties cannot
agree on a neutral, the court will select a neutral with experience appropriate to the
nature of the case from the appropriate roster developed by CADRES.
Subsection (d)(2) provides that costs for the neutral will, initially, be shared
equally by the parties-e.g., if there is one plaintiff and two defendants, each party
will pay one-third. The neutral will be required to be paid in accordance with fee
arrangements worked out directly between the neutral and the parties. Ultimately,
these costs would be assessed in accordance with Rule 54(f). The court can order
a different cost payment arrangement if, for instance, one of the parties sought in
forma pauperis status pursuant to Rule 91. If the designated neutral does not con-
sent to the revised fee arrangement, the court will designate an alternative neutral
from the CADRES roster.
Subsection (d)(3) relates to the parties agreeing with the neutral on the timing
of the conference with responsibility then placed upon the plaintiff to notify the
court of the name of the neutral and the time and place for the conference-this
notification to occur no later than 60 days after the date of the Rule 16(a) schedul-
ing order, with the conference to be held and completed no later than 120 days of
the same date.
Subsection (e) indicates that the primary function of the conference is to con-
duct the selected ADR process. The first priority is on efforts at settlement and
means of exploring settlement. If settlement does not happen then case manage-
ment issues may be discussed. There are three limitations on the neutral's address
of case management issues. First, the neutral will not address management issues
in cases that are specially assigned or subject to single judge management. Sec-
ond, the neutral cannot extend deadlines or otherwise modify directives in sched-
uling orders issued pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 16(a). Third, a conference which
adjourns after substantive claims in the case are addressed-as where one or both
parties want some time to consider an offer or a proposed resolution-need not be
reconvened if the only remaining issues to be addressed are case management
issues. This avoids the delay and expense that would otherwise be required to
reschedule, prepare for and attend a reconvened meeting.
Subsection (f) addresses conference attendees. It follows recommendation of
the ADR Planning and Implementation Committee with the addition of a new sub-
paragraph (iii) addressing participation by a designated representative of a govern-
ment agency. For many government agencies, no particular individual may have
settlement authority. See State v. Town of Franklin, 489 A.2d 525 (Me. 1985).
Subsection (f)(2) is a sanction section emphasizing that failure to attend may
subject a party to sanctions.
Subsection (f)(3) provides that in the discretion of the neutral required attend-
ees may participate by telephone. Some cases may not support requiring every
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attendee to be personally present or justify the expense of fully face to face confer-
ences.
Subsection (g) requires the plaintiff to provide copies of the listed documents
to the neutral, but only if requested by the neutral.
Subsection (h)(1) is very similar to practice under the pilot project, with the
only change being the requirement that the parties submit to the court a proposed
order concerning the settlement. The order may simply state that the parties have
agreed to a dismissal of the action with (or without) prejudice.
Subsection (h)(2) directs that, if there is no settlement, the neutral is to file a
report within 10 days. In most cases it is anticipated that the report would be pre-
pared at the end of the conference and filed shortly thereafter. Along with the
report would be, if appropriate, a proposed order to implement the report. The
report would indicate any matters on which the parties had reached agreement
such as stipulations, identification and limitation of issues to be tried, discovery
matters and any further alternative dispute resolution efforts. The report would
also indicate if there were no agreements. The subparagraph also includes a sen-
tence placing upon the parties, equally, the responsibility for assuring that the re-
port is filed in a timely manner and subjecting them to appropriate sanctions if the
report is unduly delayed. If the neutral does not file the report, or does not do so in
a timely manner, the parties are to prepare and file a report indicating their points
of agreement and disagreement. Although the report is due 10 days after the con-
ference, the court will consider it delinquent 130 days after the date of the Rule
16(a) scheduling order.
Subsection (i) defers payment of the jury fee for those cases to experience the
ADR conference until 150 days after the date of the Rule 16(a) scheduling order.
If the fee is not paid, the right to a jury trial is waived. Note that the rule does not
include a specific rule reference for the jury fee.
Subsection (j) is included to remind the court and neutrals that during ADR
proceedings they must be alert to the particular needs of the poor, the unrepre-
sented and those subject to violence, abuse or intimidation.
Subsection (k) imposes a duty of confidentiality upon all neutrals who act
pursuant to the rule. Like the analogous provision of the Maine Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, the rule prohibits, with certain exceptions, disclosure in any
private or public context. Cf. Me. Bar R. 3.6(h). The purpose of the rule is to
encourage candid and complete discussions that will enable neutrals to achieve the
goals of the process in which they are involved. The permitted disclosures are
those necessary to the process itself, for project research, or for compliance with
law, or that a neutral may make to disclose evidence of abuse or neglect of any
protected person or to prevent future criminal conduct. It is anticipated that Rule
16(B)(k)(iv), authorizing a disclosure pursuant to court order, will be utilized only
after the court finds that the need for disclosure substantially outweighs the impor-
tance of the state's policy favoring the protection of confidentiality of settlement
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discussions such as the ADR conference.
Subsection (1) provides a variety of sanctions that the court may impose on
parties or counsel who fail to comply with the express terms of the Rule and orders
issued thereunder. Specifically, the Rule focuses on appearance at the dispute
resolution conference. Other matters subject to sanction are requirements of the
Rule pertaining to filings and other deadlines. There is no sanction for failure to
participate appropriately in a conference or proceeding. Standards for determina-
tion of the appropriate level of participation would be difficult to articulate and
apply, and enforcement would raise serious problems of confidentiality. The range
of sanctions available under the Rule is intended to give the court flexible power
both to penalize noncompliance and to serve the interests of other parties and the
court in bringing an action to a fair and just resolution. The Rule expressly pro-
vides that payment of costs incurred may be awarded as a sanction, in addition to
whatever procedural remedies may be appropriate.
APPENDIX B
STATEMENT
As the Court adopts a rule to encourage the use of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion in civil cases in the Superior Court, it is useful to recall the genesis of this
effort and the benefits that can be realized through court-connected ADR.
In 1993, the Commission to Study the Future of Maine's Courts issued a com-
prehensive report making many recommendations to improve our system of jus-
tice. One overriding concern of the Futures Commission, shared by this Court,
was the need to improve the delivery of court services to our customers-liti-
gants, attorneys, and the public. A court-connected ADR program was recom-
mended, in part, to improve our service to the public by enhancing citizen liti-
gants' sense of participation in, and understanding of, court processes directly af-
fecting their lives.
This goal of improving court service to the public was necessarily not the
focus of our discussions as we examined the appropriate scope of an ADR rule, but
it was, and remains, the motivation for adopting this rule. We now have the benefit
of several studies which address litigant and public benefits of ADR. 1 These stud-
ies point to four important benefits from participation in an ADR program.
First, individuals in litigation believe that through ADR their voices are being
heard and that they have more of a say in decisions affecting their lives than in
court trial processes where decisions are perceived to be controlled largely by at-
torneys and judges;
Second, through ADR, parties gain a greater understanding of their own case,
its strengths and weaknesses, and improved understanding of the other side's point
of view;
Third, parties having participated in ADR are more willing to accept the ulti-
mate result and perceive it as fair, even if the result is against them; and
Fourth, because of greater party participation, there are fewer problems en-
forcing payment obligations and greater compliance with other terms ofjudgments
in cases that have been subject to ADR processes.
Some of these studies 2 also suggest that views about the value of ADR partici-
pation are shared to a lesser extent by attorney participants than by party partici-
pants. But if our focus is on the goals established by the Futures Commission,
including improved customer service, greater party participation in decisions af-
fecting their lives, and better public understanding of the justice system, the court-
connected ADR program we adopt-with many accommodations to the concerns
of the Bar and others-is an appropriate step to take.
1. See generally REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADR PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
COMMITTEE OF THE MAINE JUDICIAL DEPARIMENT (SEPT. 21, 1998); RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DAVID
KAREAKER and AL LEIGHTON, THE MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PILOT
PROJECT: PROGRAM EVALUATION FINAL REPORT (AUG. 26, 1998) (the Muskie School Report); MAR-
KET DECISIONS, INC., TRAPPING THE DATA: MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN MAINE (August 1997); CouRT
MEDIATION SERVICE, MEDIATION IN MAINE: FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS (1982); CRAIG A. McEwEN &
RICHARD J. MAIMAN, SMALL CLAIMS MEDIATION IN MAINE: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT, 33 ME. L.
REV. 237 (1981).
2. See Muskie School Report, pp. 18-19, 32-33.
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We are not unmindful that mandatory ADR imposes costs on attorneys and
litigants. Although in many cases, the cost of ADR will be offset by savings in
legal expense and delay, we have designed the rule to insure that it does not be-
come an economic barrier to court access. The measures that temper the expense
of ADR include the following:
1. A number of types of litigation are exempt from ADR and the court has
authority to exempt other actions for good cause shown.
2. The court is encouraged to waive the ADR requirement if the expense of
ADR would present an economic hardship to any party.
3. The parties are free to select their own neutral on their own terms.
4. Provision is made for reduced fee and pro bono services from a neutral
when necessary.
5. The requirement to pay a jury fee is deferred until the parties have engaged
in ADR.
6. Because the rule does not become effective for approximately one year, all
parties and attorneys will have ample time to establish acceptable and economical
arrangements for compliance.
*STATEMENT OF JUSTICE CLIFFORD IN NONCONCURRENCE
I decline to join in the promulgation of these changes to the Rules of Civil
Procedure making the use of alternative dispute resolution mandatory in the Supe-
rior Court.
I encourage the use of ADR. I am not convinced, however, that its use should
be mandatory. ADR is increasingly being used by litigants and attorneys on a.
voluntary basis as an effective way to resolve civil disputes. The Superior Court is
having fewer trials as more cases are being resolved without the necessity of trial.
Superior Court Justices are becoming increasingly effective in helping to settle
cases prior to trial. Accordingly, I fail to see the need for mandatory ADR.
Aside from the questionable need for mandatory ADR, there are several addi-
tional reasons why I decline to support its imposition at this time. As a result of the
recent legislative changes implementing the recommendations of the Court Unifi-
cation Task Force, see P.L. 1999, ch. 731, part ZZZ, the workload of the District
Court is likely to increase. I fear that some litigants may be encouraged to file
cases in the District Court for the purpose of avoiding mandatory ADR. Moreover,
the most appropriate time to resolve cases is unique to each case. Attorneys, liti-
gants, and Justices of the Superior Court, especially those Justices assigned to
cases under the single justice assignment system, are in the best position to evalu-
ate when that time is. Unfortunately, mandatory ADR predetermines that time for
all cases.
Most importantly, mandatory ADR imposes an additional cost on civil liti-
gants. In addition to paying substantial attorney fees, civil litigants pay service of
process fees, fees for filing cases in our courts, jury fees, and fees to appeal. Al-
though some litigants may be excused from payment, and some may not feel the
burden, the substantial costs of mandatory ADR will be an additional and unwel-
come burden on most of those seeking to access our justice system.
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APPENDIX C
LAWYER LETTER
As you know, the Court adopted Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 16B effective
January 1, 2002, mandating an ADR conference within four months of the sched-
uling order. We are studying the impact of this change on the courts, the lawyers
and the litigants.
Of the civil cases filed in the Superior Court during the first half of 2002,
approximately 600 cases to date have experienced such a conference.
At random, we have selected approximately 10% of those cases in which to
seek lawyer and client reaction to this process. The above case was one of those
selected.
This case may be ongoing, may have settled as a result of the conference or
without regard to the conference, or may have been decided after trial or a disposi-
tive motion. We ask that you answer the enclosed lawyer survey yourself and
return it to me in one of the enclosed envelopes. We also ask that you forward the
client survey along with my cover memo to the client and urge your client to re-
spond. We have enclosed another self-addressed stamped envelope for their con-
venience.
We thank you in advance for your cooperation and appreciate your participa-
tion in this study.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Dana, Jr.
Associate Justice
Chair, Court Alternative
Dispute Resolution
Service (CADRES)
HHD/ald
Enclosures

APPENDIx D
LAWYER SURVEY
Please circle the most appropriate answer to the following questions:
1. Did you represent a plaintiff, defendant or another party in the
lawsuit referenced in Justice Dana's cover letter?
P D Other
2. Do you generally favor the Court requiring counsel and the
parties to participate in an ADR conference during discovery
(i.e., 16B)?
Y N Unsure
3. Many lawyers have said that 16B would be fine if only the
lawyers could decide when to hold the conference. Would you
favor this approach?
Y N Unsure
4. Should there be a good faith requirement for the participating
attorneys?
Y N Unsure
5. Should the exemptions from Rule 16B be expanded or re-
duced?
E R Unsure
Which categories of cases should be included or excluded
from Rule 16B?
6. Should 16B apply to the same category of cases in District
Court as in Superior Court?
Y N Unsure
7. What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of 16B as
presently configured?
Strengths:
Weaknesses:
8. As it worked in the case identified in the cover letter,
a. Was the client satisfied with the process?
b. Were you satisfied?
c. Do you think the benefits achieved justified the expense?
d. Over a third, but less than half, of the cases experiencing a
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conference settled within 30 days of the conference.
Without regard to whether your case settled, do you feel the
process justified, in your case, the cost incurred by all
parties?
9. Other comments or suggestions?
APPENDIX E
LAWYER
Q1. Did you represent a plaintiff, defendant or another party in the lawsuit refer-
enced in Justice Dana's cover letter?
P D
45 39
Other
Q2. Do you generally favor the Court requiring counsel and the parties to partici-
pate in an ADR conference during discovery (i.e., 16B)?
Yes 64
No 13
Unsure 7
Other
N.B.. Attorneys representing plaintiffs "generally" favor 16B: better than 9 to 1,
while defense attorneys "generally" favor 16B almost 3 to 1.
Q3. Many lawyers have said that 16B would be fine if only the lawyers could
decide when to hold the conference. Would you favor this approach?
Yes 65
No 17
Unsure 4
1
12 4
N.B.: Defense attorneys favor lawyers setting the time: better than 8 to 1. Plain-
tiffs' attorneys favor lawyers setting the time: better than 2 to 1.
Q4. Should there be a good faith requirement for the participating attorneys?
T P D Other
Yes 63
No 10
Unsure 3 1 1
N.B.: Lawyers overwhelmingly support adding a good faith requirement to 16B.
Q5. Should the exemptions from Rule 16B be expanded or reduced?
Unsure As Is
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Which categories of cases should be included or excluded from Rule 16B?
Require mandatory ADR (16B) in the following cases Frequency
1. All personal injury cases, regardless of dollar amount in controversy or prior
attempts at ADR 2
2. Quite title actions 1
Exempt the following cases from 16B Frequency
1. Large cases requiring more discovery 4
2. When all counsel agree that it would be a waste of time 4
3. Coverage cases 4
4. Personal injury cases in which the parties know the involved insurance com-
pany will not participate in good faith - Allstate, State Farm, etc. 3
5. Cases where one or both of the parties are pro se 2
6. Actions to enforce foreign judgments< 1
7. Set a higher dollar threshold to trigger ADR 2
8. When liability is unclear until after discovery 1
9. Quite title actions 1
10. Cases between $30,000 and $50,000 1
11. Personal injury exemption of under "$30,000" should be changed to "special
damages" under $2,500<TB> 1
12. Option to choose binding arbitration 1
13. Foreclosures 1
Q6. Should 16B apply to the same category of cases in District Court as in Supe-
rior Court?
T P D Other
Yes 44 23 21
No 17 9 7 1
Unsure 22 11 10 1
N.H.: Setting aside the 27% of all attorneys who are unsure, of the balance: plain-
tiffs' attorneys favored extending 16B to the District Court: better than 2 to and
defense attorneys favor it: 3 to 1.
Q7. What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of 16B as presently config-
ured?
ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN MAINE
Strengths Frequency
1. Forces (insurance carrier) (parties) (lawyers) to seriously evaluate the case
and brings everyone together early 36
2. It resolves cases (early) 17
3. Clients (and lawyers) appreciate having a 2 nd pair of eyes(without passion
and emotion) 9
4. Forces settlement discussions early 11
5. Saves money 3
6. It's mandatory in most cases 2
7. Quality of the mediators 2
8. Gives clients more control of the process 1
9. Clients get to talk about case which leads to settlement 3
10. Reduces extended posturing 1
11. Introduces Bar to benefits of ADR 1
12. Judges liberally grant continuances 1
13. Sometimes helps with client control 1
14. Can select type of ADR 1
15. Promotes preparation from the outset 1
16. Helps avoid personal conflicts 1
17. Practically speaking, the ADR conference serves to narrow and otherwise de-
lineate the real issues presented in the case 1
18. Judicial economy 1
Weaknesses Frequency
1. Sometimes too early (especially in big cases or when liability
is disputed) 51
2. Cost is excessive in (some) (small) cases 11
3. Too many bad mediators out there 3
4. Wastes resources when settlement very unlikely 3
5. Needs a sanction for failing to participate in good faith 2
6. Does not require the adjuster to negotiate in good faith 1
7. Sometimes too much pressure to settle 1
8. Doesn't provide an incentive to settle early 1
9. Process denies me trial experience 1
10. Need more exemptions from ADR 1
11. Permits some attorneys to file very weak cases knowing that settlement dis-
cussions will be held soon 1
12. Too many lawyers use it simply as a discovery vehicle 1
13. No downside for failing to effectively participate 1
14. Insurance companies not serious about putting their best offer forward for fear
of being "squeezed" at trial 1
15. Clients of insurance carriers should be required to attend(some parties have a
limited role) 2
16. There should not be an additional four months of discovery after the ADR
conference. For the most cases we can follow the federal court five month
discovery plan and keep the ADR at four months I
20051
MAINE LAW REVIEW
17. Useless when the Allstates and State Farms dig in their heels and don't medi-
ate in good faith 2
18. There needs to be penalties for lawyers who do not follow through with a
mediation agreement or refuse to sign the final paperwork 1
19. The insurance industry uses ADR to intimidate poor people 1
20. If there are discovery disputes, or if discovery is complex, counsel is repeat-
edly required to file motions to continue 1
21. Clerks at the Cumberland County Courthouse are entirely to quick to impose
sanctions, a courtesy call should be made first 1
22. Insurance company adjusters from out of state should not be required on rou-
tine cases 1
Q8. As it worked in the case identified in the cover letter,
a. Was the client satisfied with the process?
T P D Other
Yes 42 23 19
No 25 16 9 1
Unsure 12
N.B.: While defense attorneys reported client satisfaction: about 2 to 1; plaintiffs'
attorneys reported client satisfaction: about 3 to 2.
b. Were you satisfied?
T P D Other
Yes 49 26 23
No 22 14 7 1
N.B.: Again, while defense attorneys reported overall satisfaction with the pro-
cess: better than 3 to 1; plaintiffs' attorneys were personally satisfied: almost 2 to
1.
c. Do you think the benefits achieved justified the expense (in
this case)?
T P D Other
Yes 45 25 20
No 25 15 9 1
Unsure 3
N.B.: Defense attorneys reported the benefits of 16B exceeded the expense: better
than 2 to 1 - plaintiffs' attorneys: 5 to 3.
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d. Over a third, but less than half, of the cases experiencing a
conference settled within 30 days of the conference. Without
regard to whether your case settled, do you feel the process
justified, in your case, the cost incurred by all parties?
T P D Other
Yes 48 29 19
No 20 12 7 1
N.B.: Both Defense attorneys and plaintiffs' attorneys said that generally they
thought the benefit of 16B justified the cost: better than 2 to 1.
Q9. Other comments or suggestions?
1. This particular case settled after two ADRs. The first ended in
a stalemate. The second was held by Judge Bradford. I do not
think you can underestimate the impact of hearing from a
judge. My client loved Judge Bradford. She respected Judge
Bradford. She happened to be a wonderful lady and there was
no client control problem, however, the judicial conference
was extraordinary. Moreover, this would have been a four-day
trial without court intervention.
2. Not appropriate for all cases, sometimes just too far apart.
Some mediators are much better than others-few are as good
as the judges.
3. I favor the continuation of ADR.
4. My only conviction regarding this process is that a mediation,
etc. should take place after more discovery has taken place and
not quite so early.
5. Extend the time for completing ADR to six or eight months.
6. Give the attorney sixty days after an answer is filed to agree on
a deadline for ADR. If the attorneys cannot agree, then the
court should impose a deadline.
7. Parties and adjusters should have some flexibility whether to
participate by phone. Although it is important to have every-
one attend, sometimes it is expensive and difficult.
8. Counsel and the courts are having to deal with sometimes
repeated motions to extend the now early ADR deadline.
Counsel should be required to file their ADR report at the
same time their estimate of the time for trial is due, i.e., fifteen
days following the close of discovery. It will cut down on the
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motion paperwork if counsel can decide when the parties and
insurers are "ripe" for the ADR.
9. 1 am in favor of ADR. I do mostly insurance defense work and
the process gives me leverage with carriers. That is, carriers
know they are required to participate in good faith and by and
large do so. Many of these carriers would have refused ADR
before adoption of Rule 16B. There is always some value in
getting people in the same room even if the case does not
settle. My only concern is that some courts are less than
flexible regarding enlargements.
10. At the outset, I was delighted with how mediation under Rule
16B worked. Cases that I never thought would settle did. As
lawyers began to realize that there was no real consequence to
not participating earnestly, I have found the settlement rate
decrease. I also have seen many "settled" cases continue to
drag on in collateral disputes about what the settlement was.
11. This is a sea change in Maine litigation. It has substantial
costs directly associated with it. There is marginal improve-
ment in the settlement rate, but primarily time. Time pressure
is completely ramped up in cases compared to ten years ago.
Relax the time requirement, please, to reduce the cost and
retain the benefits.
12. Could get a lot more cases settled if ADR were not held until
(1) after the discovery deadline has expired; or (2) the involved
attorneys agree to schedule it.
13. Insurance companies should not be able to select mediators.
This happens frequently with only mediators on insurance lists
being utilized. The insurance companies also collect a fee for
selecting these mediators.
14. The Rule should permit the attorneys to schedule mandatory
ADR before the TMC.
15. Want longer and permit counsel to motion the court for
exclusion.
16. Sanctions for refusal to participate in good faith, not for being
late in scheduling or reporting results.
17. ADR should be scheduled by the parties within one month of
the close of discovery. The parties should certify that this has
been done within days for trial estimate. Motions would be
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filed only when one party wishes to opt out of ADR or one
party wishes to force ADR on an earlier day.
18. ADR held before my client added as a party to the lawsuit.
Perhaps a problem that the rule should address.
19. There was no real "estate" here. Counsel agreed to handle the
lawsuit as though one had been established and limit the claim
to the available insurance.
20. Before imposing sanctions for failure to designate a neutral in
a timely fashion, the court should at least attempt to contact
counsel and check on the status of selection. With indigent
litigants, in particular, it is sometimes difficult to find an
appropriate neutral who will serve pro bono in thirty days.
21. If mandatory ADR is to be continued it should not be required
until discovery is complete. There should be an "opt out" if
both attorneys agree that it is a waste of time and resources.
22. Build in a procedure for some extensions of time without court
approval.
23. ADR caused plaintiff's initial attorney to withdraw. I assumed
the file and accepted a higher post-mediation offer.
24. This is a very good program that is a natural addition to
modem rules of procedure and discovery.
25. Mediation needs to be required in District Court.
26. 1 approve of the ADR process, and would like to see it used in
civil cases in District Court where the amount in controversy
exceeds a set amount.
27. The good faith requirement should extend to the adjuster
whose presence should be mandatory.
28. I like the system the way it is. The Courts have been agreeable
to allow flexibility in timing. This is good and should be
encouraged.
29. Set the ADR deadline between four and six months as opposed
to between two and four months.
30. Require adjusters to have "full" settlement authority.
20051
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31. Allow the parties, by agreement only, to postpone ADR by up
to thirty or sixty days upon filing certification that they have
conducted discovery expeditiously and in good faith, but need
the following discovery... in order to participate in ADR in a
meaningful way.
32. Only that we modify the process to assure that the case is well
enough developed before mediation so the parties and media-
tors have the facts and can judge the strength of the claims and
cost of settling.
33. I think that the judicial settlement conferences offer at least
two additional benefits. First, to the extent that these confer-
ences are conducted at a courthouse, the parties are perhaps
more inclined to think that they have had "their day in court."
Secondly, notwithstanding the high quality of our ADR
mediation group, I believe that the parties may be more
impressed by the fact that the mediator is a judge.
34. In this particular case, the Defendant would not even discuss
settlement at the mediation. This is the only case I have had
where the Defendant would not even discuss settlement at
mediation.
35. It is a good mandate, though it needs some flexibility depend-
ing on the nature of the case.
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CLIENT LETTER
To: Whom it May Concern
From: Hon. Howard H. Dana, Jr.
Re: Court-connected ADR Survey
If you are reading this, it means that your lawyer has forwarded it to you. In a
recent case in the Superior Court of the State of Maine, you either participated in
an ADR conference (mediation, arbitration or a neutral evaluation) or your case
settled on the eve of that conference.
Requiring clients and their lawyers to participate in an ADR conference before
trial is new to our Superior Court and we would like to get your reaction to the
process, the timing and the cost. We appreciate your taking a few moments to
answer our questions and returning the "Party Survey" in the enclosed stamped
self-addressed envelope.

APPENDIX G
CLIENT SURVEY
Please circle the most appropriate answer to the following questions:
1. Were you a plaintiff or a defendant in the lawsuit referenced in your lawyer's
letter?
P D Other
2. Did the case settle as a result of the mediation, arbitration or case evalua-
tion?
Y N Unsure
3. Was the timing of your conference with the mediator, arbitrator, or evalua-
tor appropriate?
Too soon Just right Too late
4. Was the cost of the conference (including the cost of your participation,
your lawyer's participation and your share of the neutral's fee) worth the
benefits (if any) received?
Y N Unsure
5. Generally, are you glad that the Court system required the parties and their
lawyers to meet with a neutral (such as a mediator, arbitrator, or case evalu-
ator) to facilitate settlement discussions?
Y N Unsure
6. Many lawyers have said that the timing of the conference should be set by
the lawyers at a time of their choosing. They believe that forcing the parties
and the lawyers to meet before discovery is complete can be unproductive.
Others feel that the attempt to settle the case early saves the cost of trial
preparation. Should the lawyers have the discretion to set the time of the
ADR conference whenever they jointly agree or should the Court system
set the time of the conference?
Lawyers set time Court sets time
7. Do you have any other suggestions how the court system could have made
settling or resolving your case more likely or easier?
Y N Unsure

APPENDIX H
Other Suggestions from Clients
1I (From a D that did not settle): 'There are cases where we don't want to
pay anything and I do not feel the Courts should have the right to force
settlement, even when it is obvious the claim is completely frivolous."
2. (From a D who settled in conference): "Give plaintiffs' lawyers the right
to make 'offers of judgment' equivalent to protect against defense lawyers
who unnecessarily keep the clock running just to build up fees."
3. (From a P who settled in conference): "I was so happy to settle out of
court. I have never been in court for any reason and was petrified about
facing that!"
4. (From a D who settled and thought the lawyers should set the time of the
conference): "but if the Court sets the time it may urge the lawyers to try
to get things together before that time arrives and not to linger."
5. (From an insurance adjuster who was unsure whether the case settled as a
result of the mediation): "Many settle after being set up at a mediation."
6. (From the same adjuster who thought the cost of the conference was not
worth the benefits): "Having participated in hundreds - many voluntary
and now court mandated - too soon and costs too high. Suggest you
allow adjuster option to attend without counsel. This would be well
received."
7. (From the same adjuster): "Some cases are straight forward with legiti-
mate differences in value, and mediation will <UB>not<UE> change that.
If both parties waive mediation it should be eliminated. In this case, both
attorneys were experienced, but additional material (meds) had yet to be
obtained. With full meds - mediation was not necessary. Mediation
needs both parties to work. We wish to use it, if the situation warrants.
To be honest - cases have settled that I never gave a chance.
8. (From a P who settled at the session and wants the court to continue to set
the time for the conference): "otherwise it may not happen and a lot of
time and money can be expended needlessly."
9. (From the same adjuster, but in another case that did settle at the media-
tion that was timed "just right" and the benefits worth the cost): "Media-
tion needs both parties on board. Should be voluntary not mandated."
10. (From a P who did not settle, but thought the court should set the time of
the conference): "I am not sure about this but my gut reaction is that if
lawyers can make more money by setting time, I don't like it."
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11. (From the same P): "I wish we could have met face to face with our
Defendants. Instead we were in separate rooms with messages being
shuttled between rooms."
12. (From a P who did not settle): "It is unwise to require medication before
discovery is complete or while motions for summary judgment (or
motions to dismiss experts, etc.) are pending. We were required to attend
one mediation before discovery; two settlement conferences before the
trial judge ruled on outstanding motions for summary judgment. Both
experiences were very aggravating, time consuming, expensive for the
defendant since they had two attorneys, an insurance adjuster present.
They complained that their expenses were so high that this was their
justification for offering a low settlement amount. These two settlement
conferences were aggravating and time consuming and the defense had no
incentive to settle before the judge's running was complete and all parties
knew this. My suggestion - if the court is going to order the parties to
negotiate - do so after discovery is complete and motion rulings are
determined. Prior to that allow (even encourage) parties to mediate and
settle. If they have this inclination, they will do so on their own."
"I would have been more satisfied with the process if our final mediator/
judge had studied the case before meeting with us. He made it known at
the beginning that he had read nothing about the case except a letter from
the defense attorney. Therefore his guidance was based on a 15 minute
presentation by counsel for each side and a short question/answer period
with defendant/plaintiff. It was clear he did not know or understand the
merits of the case; and, therefore, his guidance seemed more about
manipulating the emotions of the parties rather than highlighting the legal
merits of the case. I thought this whole experience was about laws being
violated, and I expected more emphasis on this from the Maine Superior
Court. Our settlement judge could at least have read the trial judge's
summary judgment rulings - at least. Thousands of pages of documenta-
tion were available for review. Although it is important for the mediator
to inform the parties about the practical aspects of the case (i.e., adverse
publicity, the extended time period for appeal, etc.) it is equally important
to provide realistic overview of the laws and this can only be done by
someone who understand the case. Require the mediators to be prepared
by studying the case in advance with whatever documentation is avail-
able."
13. (From a D who did settle): Adjusters should be permitted to participate by
phone.
APPENDIX I
NEUTRAL LETTER
As you may have heard, I have been studying the impact of 16B on the opera-
tion of the Superior Court. I have been sharing my "updates" with a growing list
of people both within and outside the court system. Most recently, I have sent a
letter to a representative sample of attorneys whose cases have experienced a 16B
conference seeking their input and the input of their clients. Without meaning to
bury you in paper, I enclose a copy of my most recent update including the very
first report on the responses of lawyer and client participants.
From our review of case dockets, you are one of a relatively small group that
collectively served as the mediators in over two-thirds of the cases I have been
studying. As such, I seek your guidance, advice and input with respect to the
future of 16B.
Without meaning to limit you, I particularly would like your thoughts on the
following subjects:
Timing: Many lawyers, clients and some mediators have suggested that 16B
would be vastly improved if mediation could occur when the lawyers decide it will
be most productive. Others have suggested that to leave the timing of the media-
tion to negotiation will result in most cases being mediated on the eve of trial. For
those cases that could have settled earlier, the economic cost of delay may be sub-
stantial. Further, it may not be efficient or even appropriate to mandate private
ADR on the eve of a Superior Court mediation session? If, on the other hand, one
can document that a particular insurance company never increases their original
offer until the eve of trial (if then), does it make sense to require mandatory media-
tion during discovery?
Good Faith: Should 16B be amended to require that all participants partici-
pate in the 16B mediation in "good faith"? Although this suggestion appears to be
overwhelmingly popular with attorney respondents, some fear that such an amend-
ment will generate lawsuits within lawsuits and drag mediators into those dis-
putes.
Any guidance you would be willing to share with me would be much appreci-
ated. You might also wish to share your views with Warren Silver, Esq., chair of
the Civil Rules Committee.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Dana, Jr.
Associate Justice
HHD/ald
Enclosures
cc: Warren M. Silver, Esq.
